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CONTENTS

10 July 1992

ALBANIA

Editorial Views Albanian-U.S. Relations [RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 19 Jun]	1
Berisha Answers Trade Unionists' Questions [SINDIKALISTI 14 Jun]	2
Parliament's Neglect of Countryside Protested [PROGRESI 9 Jun]	5
Support for Peasants Associations Urged [RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE 19 Jun]	6

HUNGARY

Assessment of Visegrad Three-EC Relationship [FIGYELO 4 Jun]	7
Discussion on National Defense, Security Policy	9
Kodolanyi Interviewed [MAGYAR NEMZET 27 May]	9
Congressional Hearing [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 3 Jun]	11
Challenge to President's Appointing Power	12
Coalition Statement [NEPSZABADSAG 26 May]	12
Debreczeni's Commentary [NEPSZABADSAG 26 May]	13
Court Secrecy Explained [NEPSZABADSAG 27 May]	15
Boross on Former, Present Interior Ministries [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 19 May]	15
Interior Minister on Ministry's Security Mandate [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 25 May]	17
Exempting Court Officials From Civil Service [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 19 May]	18

POLAND

Businessmen See Lack of Dynamism in Market [POLITYKA 30 May]	19
--	----

ROMANIA

Biography of CD Presidential Candidate [DREPTATEA 30 Jun]	24
---	----

CROATIA

New Foreign Minister on Diplomatic Objectives [VECERNJI LIST 20 Jun]	25
Liberals Propose Budisa as Presidential Candidate [VECERNJI LIST 2 Jul]	26
Osijek Mayor on City's Mafia-Type Crimes [NOVI VJESNIK 19 Jun]	26
Stipe Mesic Discusses History of HDZ [NOVI VJESNIK 19 Jun]	27

SLOVENIA

Serbian Orthodox Church Violates Sanctions [DELO 17 Jun]	29
--	----

YUGOSLAVIA

Effect of Economic Sanctions on Montenegro [POBJEDA 21 Jun]	30
Proposal To Found Montenegro Council for Peace [POBJEDA 20 Jun]	31
Speech by FRY President at Serbian Academy [POLITIKA 16 Jun]	31
Serbian Academy Meeting on Ethnic Issues [POLITIKA 20 Jun]	34
General Says Fear of Intervention Unfounded [POLITIKA 19 Jun]	35
General Reveals Counterintelligence Secrets [NIN 12 Jun]	36
Data on Croatian Army Activities in Bosnia [POLITIKA 20 Jun]	41
Croatian-Muslim Pact Seen as All-Out War Option [POLITIKA 21 Jun]	42
Government Mistreats Kosovars, Drops Bombs [Zofingen RILINDJA 26 Jun]	43
Serbian Police 'Mistreatment' of Albanians [Zofingen RILINDJA 26 Jun]	44
Biographic Data of President's General Secretary [POLITIKA 19 Jun]	44

Editorial Views Albanian-U.S. Relations

AU0607105392 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 19 Jun 92 p 1

[Editorial by Petro Dhimitri: "A Special and Very Great Success for Democracy"]

[Text] Through its representative, Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha, our first anticommunist president in the last 50 years, Albanian democracy achieved, on Monday 15 June 1992, a special and very great success. Presidents George Bush and Sali Berisha held that day the first meeting, so long awaited in the history of both peoples. For various historic reasons, from 1912 up to the time of World War II, the opportunities were not created for the leaders of both our states to have the direct contact to talk either in Washington or Tirana. Nevertheless, Albania did not lack aid from the United States, this giant state not only in size and potential, but also for its level of democracy and scientific, technical, and cultural development. We should remind you not only of active U.S. protection against our country's breakup, but also of the focal points of learning of Albanian-U.S. culture, the technical schools of Tirana and the agricultural school in Kavaje. They have still remained models of excellent humanitarian work by Harry Fulc [as published] and his U.S. colleagues in Albania. That is why we remember them with great respect even today. However, the communist ideology of the dictator Enver Hoxha invented an imaginary enmity with the United States and every developed and democratic Western country, thus isolating Albania for 50 successive years. We have suffered the greatest damage that can be inflicted on a people. The U.S. aid was very evident as soon as democracy started on its way in Albania. We cannot forget the very democratic and affectionate activity of Mr. William Ryerson and the U.S. Embassy personnel for Albania during the trial year for democracy in our country. That was a moral and material aid, a compassionate hand to open our eyes. We should bear in mind the perfect features by Elez Biberaj and his colleagues of the Voice of America, which were an extraordinary moral and spiritual help to shatter dictatorship without violence and blood.

Thus, the attraction for democrats and Albanian democracy of the United States came naturally, because it emerged from honest and sincere hearts, our desire for democracy, and their readiness to save us from the abyss. A special contribution in this attraction is undoubtedly played by Prof. Dr. Sali Berisha and the Democratic Party that found the future model of the martyred and destroyed Albania in the United States, Germany, Italy, Greece, France, the United Kingdom, and Europe. That is why the road of cooperation with the United States and the developed "imperialist and hostile" world was widely opened with the victory of democracy on 22 March 1992. Hardly three months had passed after this historic victory when President George Bush received our democratically elected president Sali Berisha in the presence of Mr. Baker, chief of U.S. diplomacy, and Mr. Ryerson, U.S. ambassador in Tirana.

It was not that President Bush did not know the situation in Albania and our woes, but through the meeting with Berisha, President Bush created more powerful relations with and a greater consideration for Albania. This meeting is simultaneously a promise that this super-democratic state is making to a small country that cherishes a great love for the United States. Our freedom-loving youth especially wants the United States to stay near us. The green light is immediately given for the textile industry to resume work. Berisha started his meetings at the U.S. Congress and Senate. Various banking institutions of international importance and institutions of other economic and political sectors discussed considering Albania a special case, because it is Europe's poorest state and has experienced the most fierce and merciless dictatorship. Without hiding anything, President Berisha sounded the alarm bells for the year 1993 and humanitarian aid was promised. That does not mean that Albanians should not work. This will be our salvation to recover after the communist-socialist plague and together with it to start the technical cooperation that will be sanctioned in conventions and agreements with the IMF and other financial institutions of special importance.

The reception of President Berisha by a great national and an international personality like George Bush also encourages our national question, because it supports it directly. At a time when Serbia is making plans for a massacre in Kosovo, the reception itself that Mr. Bush gives to President Berisha is a clear sign for Milosevic and every warmonger that this small, martyred, brave, and peace-and-freedom-loving people enjoys U.S. support. This is great support and at a favorable time. I would say that this is a just assessment of that spiritual relations that Albanians have with the United States, either for our brothers who live there or its multifaceted fantastic achievements that still remain a great example to us.

This visit is also a trial balloon for our fellow patriots in the United States. They are now welcomed to Albania to invest and visit, because their capital is and will be protected by democratic contemporary legislation. They are now making the difference between the former communist President Ramiz Alia, who invited them without ensuring the appropriate legislation, and President Sali Berisha, who, as a real democrat, invited them not out of courtesy, but he legally guaranteed all the rights of ownership and dual nationality to them. He guaranteed these rights not only to them, but to any U.S. businessman who is welcomed to our country, as are other capitalists of any other state, who will make investments of a reciprocal profit.

We will not describe the thanks, applause, and hearts that beat with common love, because this article would never end. We want to say that this historic visit is a colossal crowning of all our new diplomacy in these three months of its life. It will undoubtedly yield its own fruits

to the benefit of the miserable Albania and the friendship with the United States itself that we have and that we want to further strengthen.

Berisha Answers Trade Unionists' Questions

*AU0507160392 Tirana SINDIKALISTI in Albanian
14 Jun 92 pp 1-3*

[Article by Halil F. Laze: "Discussion With President Berisha"]

[Text] The National Council of the Union of Independent Trade Unions [BSPSh] held a working meeting in the Palace of Congresses on 10 June, which turned into a frank discussion with the president, Professor Dr. Sali Berisha.

Mr. Valer Xheka, chairman of the BSPSh Managing Council, opened the meeting. He informed the president that the formal and often tendentious way in which the 80-percent wage rate had been abolished before a law on social assistance has been issued has seriously jeopardized working people's living standards. He also stressed that the government must be more determined in carrying out the reform. An almost four-hour discussion followed, involving almost all the district chairmen and chairmen of professional branches. In this issue, we will publish some of the speeches that struck us as being most important, including both the problems that were raised and the president's explanations or interpolations.

[Ferdinand Sulaj, Vlore] Before you give me your word, get ready! If you make a promise, keep it! This was the leitmotif of Mr. Sulaj's speech. He described the situation in Vlore District, which is very tense and will continue to deteriorate with the rise in unemployment. The most sensitive point is no doubt the PVC Factory.

Many enterprises are not working because of the sabotage of the managers, who are continuing to commit serious malpractices. Nobody bothers about the motorboat that remained in Italy at the time of the exodus. It is impossible to find even a few meters of cable for the cableway, let alone investment for the cement factory to resume work.

[Berisha] Unfortunately, the idea of the centralized state is still being insistently and fanatically defended. Without wishing to shirk the state's responsibility, I aim for the utmost independence for enterprises. If this independence is not attained, work will never run smoothly. Let me give you an example. A group of incompetent bureaucrats had stated that the seaport could not handle more than 1,000 tons of goods. A brief study showed that the port could handle 10,000-15,000 tons of goods, not even calculating that the ports of Shengjin and Vlore are entirely out of service.

I consider all the demands from Vlore District to be fair, and I would like to know exactly what investment the cement factory requires. I am aware of the problems of the PVC Factory, and it will resume work soon.

[Xhevdet Llubani, Pogradec] Many enterprises are closed because of acts of destruction. We know who committed these and why. Now, with the reform, there is a danger of 5,000 workers for democracy being left jobless, and working people's rights and interests are seriously threatened.

Corruption, this serious plague. [sentence as published] The Executive Committee, which just managed to provide us with an office with two or three chairs, is now demanding dollars for every square meter and every chair.

The future of the ferronickel and coal mines is an open question. The government has made no full study, and we only have certain opinions scattered among the newspapers or aired on television.

[Berisha] As for ferronickel, you must think of both yourselves and your customers. The workers of the Elbasan Steel Combine told me that they would buy it if you reduced the price a little. At my meeting with [Macedonian President] Mr. Gligorov, he said that Macedonia needs a great deal of ferronickel and might start to buy it soon. You have a major problem with coal. It is well known that this coal is of low calorific value and is not worth extracting, but all the intellectuals and specialists working there must find a solution and not wait for the ministry.

I am glad that you raised the problem of corruption. This is no doubt the greatest and most difficult fight that the new democratic state will undertake. It must be clear to the entire people that corruption is Albania's greatest enemy. In the last two years, the opponents of democracy have struck at us with a very serious weapon—corruption. However, do not forget that corruption cannot be combated by corrupt people. It is your honor and duty as trade unionists to uncompromisingly fight it yourselves. Unfortunately, ruffians and bandits have even succeeded in penetrating the Public Order Ministry. The purge must be radical. We must not carry this out for party reasons, but in the interests of the homeland. The time has come for us to judge people as honest or dishonest. How can you say that the Vlore Investigator's Office and its staff of 18 have worked, when only three cases come to court each month?

Nevertheless, we have a lot of difficulties in replacing corrupt cadres, so many that we have started an express training course for investigators.

[Gezim Kalaja, mines, geology, mineral enrichment] The Geology and Mining Trade Union came to the meeting with the president with a memorandum approved by its presidium. Mr. Gezim Kalaja raised the following problems with the president:

—Reviewing the laws on pensions, trade unions, and enterprises.

—Giving priority to the employment of miners, geologists, and mineral enrichers through opportunities for alternative professions and economic emigration.

—The statement by Mr. Abdyl Xhaja about 70-percent cuts in geology and 50-percent cuts in coal and ferronickel mining seems to us to be baseless and irresponsible. If cuts of this size were to be made, the losses would be incalculable.

[Berisha] You must realize that, when we assumed power, we fell into a legislative void. The former state had laws, and many of them. However, they were drafted in such a way as to perpetuate the state's illegal and immoral rule, and to convict people for a thought, a sign of discontent, or a word, and not to ensure that the economy worked and developed.

Unfortunately, we have very few specialists in the drafting of laws. They are working hard and with dedication, but a great deal remains to be done.

I assure you that important decisions will be made soon to improve working and living conditions. A five-day week will be introduced, and women will not work the midnight shift. The government will guarantee the goods in the basket [of essential items whose prices remain frozen], and not per family but per person. Prices will be freed, but there will be a fixed ceiling and compensation in wages. Working people will not pay more for their necessary food than they do now. The previous government left us in inconceivable destitution. It did not even secure oil, sugar, and soap. In this short period, the government has contracted large quantities of these items. They will arrive soon, and there will be no shortage on the market.

As for the laws, we are working and will continually work to improve and perfect them. A democratic state needs democratic laws.

As for the drastic cuts in geology and mining, I do not see any reason for them. You should not worry about the ideas specialists raise. In the final analysis, every individual or manager has the right to express his view. However, it is the government and the parliament that decide in the end. I personally would advise you to create a coal corporation. This would remove you from dependency on the state, and I am sure that you yourselves will find the ways and means to survive. The intellectual potential of your corporation would be much greater than that of the ministries.

[Genc Rushaj, Elbasan] Besides voicing concern about the current situation of workers in Elbasan District, especially in the (phantom) [allusion to the fact that the steel combine is perpetually enveloped in emissions smoke and cannot be seen] Steel Combine, Mr. Genc Rushaj raised a specific problem. The Socialist Party is working intensively to create cells within the combine. There is no end to the Socialist Party's paradoxes. Those who turned this combine into a ruin and poisoned not only the workers and inhabitants of Elbasan but also the

vegetation of the entire Shkumbin area are trying to illegally create cells in order to achieve the final destruction of the individual.

[Berisha] The problem seems to me one of special importance. The Socialist Party has consciously violated the law on parties. It is used to invading workplaces, but we will not allow this. I will send a message to the parliament.

[Asqeri Boci, Gjirokaster] The administration must be urgently changed. We cannot only not successfully introduce a market economy with the old administration, but will fail before we begin.

Besides dividing people into the honest and the corrupt, which the trade union must identify at every moment, I think that another distinction must be made between normal party members and fanatical party members who put the narrow interests of their party above the great and broad interests of the nation.

A detailed analysis of the activities of all those who used to be in power is necessary. There were many abuses. Let us start our analysis with these people.

There is a joint Albanian-Greek enterprise in Gjirokaster, in which the foreign party alone lays down the law, even deciding the appointments on the Albanian side. So far, 25 workers have been dismissed and replaced by others. We have turned to the Supreme Court about all these violations, but have not received an answer in three months.

[Berisha] You must not on any account allow foreigners to exceed their legitimate authority in joint enterprises. I have seen signs of abuses and speculation in some of these firms. We will conduct strict and detailed investigations. The trade union's assistance regarding all these violations is vital. You are among the most democratic of institutions, and it is well known that a truly democratic state cannot be constructed without such institutions.

[Luan Kurti, Lushnje] I do not agree with the concentration of all authority in managers. Let us not forget that it is they who reduced the enterprises to such a plight. There are factories, such as the brickyards, that require no imported raw materials but that still are not working or are working below capacity.

The tendency of some individuals to reclaim their old property, not leaving a single inch of land to the bulk of the peasantry, is also disturbing.

The law limiting wage increases must to my mind be suspended, because it is a law that smacks of socialism.

Staple foodstuffs in the basket are still being freely sold on the private market. Nobody worries, and nobody interferes. The financial police look the other way.

[Berisha] We came to power without a stack of files. We will judge the abilities of the directors of enterprises, not

from a party angle, but according to their total commitment to carrying out the reform. We will remove the State Control Commission from the Council of Ministers and place it under the parliament, thus giving it more authority and scope for action. We will spare nothing to support this indispensable state body. I am convinced that the State Control Commission will do great work. We will strike hard at whoever is corrupt, regardless of what party he belongs to or what his virtues are.

[Niko Koxhaku, Defense and Public Order Ministries] Civilian employees at the Defense and Public Order Ministries have been working under very difficult conditions. The women at "Mjeks" [not further identified] are still working under very difficult conditions. I think that other work must be found for them.

Civilian employees are presently faced with two reforms: the economic reform and the military reform.

If the Fier nitrate plant resumes work, "Mjeks" can also start work again.

Corrupt managers from the single-party era are still in place. Sixteen tonnes of alcohol disappeared from "Mjeks," at a time when the director is selling brandy, vermouth, and other alcoholic drinks.

[Berisha] The Albanian state was a military state. As a result, society was also militarized in this pillbox of a state. There can be no democracy in a military state and society, and we must therefore demilitarize the state and society as soon as possible.

The military budget in the world's poorest state was the highest in Europe in relation to the size of population.

They are determined to create fair democratic relationships in the Army. I have the pleasure of being able to tell you that the majority of servicemen have supported us in the reform. We will carry out the reform in the Army in a considered way, and with very favorable conditions for servicemen.

There is very powerful technology in the Army, with very highly qualified personnel. We will adapt this technology (in Gramsh, Polican, etc.) for civilian purposes. It is regrettable that military institutions are not working as much as they should to assist the reform, the state, and the Army.

I have personally dealt with "Mjeks," and I assure you that it will resume work immediately.

[Valer Lubonja, Tirana] Unfortunately, the reform began in a backward way. Privatization was obstructed, and only those in power profited. According to the law passed by parliament, they must be held responsible and brought to justice.

I have the impression that we are isolated again. It is impossible to obtain a visa at the Italian Embassy.

I think that we must fight more strongly for economic emigration.

[Berisha] You are right, but do not forget that Italy has been in an institutional crisis for some time.

[Rexhep Polisi, Librazhd] Abdyl Xhaja's statement about the closure of Prrnjas worries me considerably.

It is regrettable, but even when we received offers for the sale of minerals, we were obstructed by the ministry or by Mineralimpeks.

The drain of livestock continues; they arrive loaded on trucks from Lushnje, Fier, etc. There is no sense in feeding ourselves with the meat of elderly animals, while our neighbors enjoy the meat of our young livestock.

I think that the Radio-Television must be more candid. It often issues dry statements without full information.

[Berisha] When you receive offers for the sale of minerals, you must sign the contracts yourselves. Forget Mineralimpeks! The economic reform cannot be carried out with the moldy ideas and methods of socialism that utterly failed.

As for the radio and television news, I have issued an instruction that my meetings must be reported as briefly as possible. I have many meetings, and I do not want the Albanian television viewer to be preoccupied solely with me.

[Marko Shipcka, transportation] It is well known that Albania cannot resume work if transportation does not function. The truck fleets are almost entirely ruined. They must be repaired as soon as possible, but the government says that there are no funds.

People are disappointed at the decision of the Finance Ministry to suspend 80-percent wage payments and to reduce pay to 60-70 percent, or to 50 percent after 1 July. We as a trade union have opposed this and demand your intervention.

I do not at all understand Mr. Genc Ruli's attitude, which would lead us to capitalism with a socialist shape. To impose a ceiling on wages and to pretend that workers' rest homes are subsidized by the state, etc., does not seem to me a fair way of behaving and thinking.

No final and well-argued decision has been issued regarding the ADA Company, Sejdin [Sejdin Hajdia, chairman of Illyria Holdings], etc.

[Berisha] We will urgently use a loan that has been agreed for transportation. I am sure that something will be done soon.

As for the laws, I would ask you to make the laws that other neighboring countries in the East have found the most useful and fruitful. We will no longer experiment with people's destinies. We will take from the world what is best. Let us use this chance that has been given to us as well as we possibly can.

Neither the government nor the parliament but rather the court deals with foreign firms. We will neither exceed nor confuse our responsibilities.

[Rajmonda Pacuku, Post Office and Telecommunications] We demand the immediate restructuring of the Post Office. We have also demanded a meeting with you about this. Sokol Hoxha's friends and buddies still work in and manage the Post Office, the same people who planted bugs and carried out surveillance, and still do.

[Berisha] There is no doubt that we will deal with the Post Office immediately. We will make appointments on the basis of professional ability and not political affiliation. I have information about bugging and surveillance.

[Muhamet Gradeci, Shkoder] There are many corrupt people. I think that your party must be purged, too. Corruption spreads at a geometric rate, while the fight against it proceeds arithmetically.

Medicinal herbs valued at \$158,000, which were to be illegally exported, were seized in Shkoder. The Financial Police arrested the dealers, but the investigator released them. These people must be sentenced to jail terms. Corruption cannot be fought by decrees.

[Berisha] No. Corruption cannot be fought by decrees.

[Vangjel Aleks, health] We all know that health workers have been close to people in their troubles. They immediately supported the struggle for democracy and did not for a moment stop work, despite the very difficult conditions and the unprecedented terror. However, although there have been several meetings with the ministry, nothing has been resolved yet. The prime minister has not condescended to meet with us.

I think that the Health Ministry must be restructured. It should have a coordinating function. There are also opportunities for privatization in this important and irreplaceable sector. So far, virtually nothing has been done. The dental service and pharmacies especially could be privatized quickly and without problems.

We want to know what the state budget for health is, because aid does indeed cover certain needs, but it cannot do everything.

We have asked for vacation pay, but we have received no reply.

(Note: Even though the president did not reply, we hope that, as a former doctor, he is well aware of the problems of the health service.)

[Ilir Bezhani, art and culture] We have many worries. I have spoken to the minister, but we have found no support. All the country's theaters are closed, except for the National Theater.

[Berisha] The press writes about "Albapel" and not the theaters.

[Ilir Bezhani] We have sent a petition, but have not received a reply. We do not know how the people will air their troubles without culture and art. It is terrible, but it must be said that many talented actors have been forced to emigrate to survive. They are in unskilled jobs; for instance, Eva Alikaj is working as a waitress.

I think that there are opportunities for the theaters to survive. We performed "The Ghost" 14 times and earned 1 million leks. However, amazingly, the performance was prohibited and deemed illegal.

[Berisha] You are quite right. We will find a solution without fail. It is an unpardonable and cynical shortcoming.

P.S. Trade union chairmen from the districts of Korce, Puke, Tropoje, Berat, Fier, Lac, Mat, and Kukes and from the engineering industry, agriculture, and education also spoke. We were unable to publish their comments for technical reasons.

Parliament's Neglect of Countryside Protested

AU2906143492 Tirana PROGRESI in Albanian
9 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Llazar Parangoni: "Silence Over the Countryside"]

[Text] Two and one-half months have passed since the elections that produced the multiparty parliament. They were brought forward, and all our people relied on the 22 March election to make their aspirations real. Disappointed for 45 consecutive years by the party-state, peasants at last voted for genuine democracy and for moving quickly toward European civilization in order to make up for lost time.

In spite of some brief interruptions, our official parliament assembled and worked in many areas, approving laws that are helping to reform life throughout the country. As far as we know, however, the parliament has maintained silence over the countryside. The problems of various fields have been discussed, but not those of the countryside. This silence has dashed the peasants' hopes, leaving them to the mercy of fate.

We have recently met with peasants from different districts. All of them seem to be silent, tired, and even remorseful because of this lack of consideration. They expected more from this parliament, from this government, just as they were promised during the election campaign. The account sheet shows that little is being done for the peasants. The parliamentarians say that the peasants will be helped with credits, loans, and other forms of material support, but so far only a small amount of chemical fertilizers has been put up for auction. The peasants not only did not win in this "trick," they lost.

We have previously described the situation in the countryside and the troubles of the peasants today. Land distribution is being delayed again and disputes have

arisen. The peasants work the distributed land physically, but they cannot find chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Hundreds of specialists are out of work. In some areas bread remains a major problem. Communications were cut long ago. The newspapers and the mail do not reach the countryside. Transportation has almost been paralyzed where bus services once existed. There are other problems, too. However, the parliament remains silent. There are comings and goings among political bodies centrally and in the districts. Some doors open and some close; some problems are solved and some people only receive promises.

Should the parliament remain silent in the face of this situation in the countryside? There are many problems in the country, but the biggest ones are in the countryside. Solving the problems in the countryside first will help solve other problems more quickly. Let us wait to see what the parliament will say later!

Support for Peasants Associations Urged

*AU1007080292 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE
in Albanian 19 Jun 92 page number unknown*

[Article by Mehil Tanushi: "The Immediate Efficiency of Private Agricultural Associations"]

[Text] Following the destruction of the agricultural cooperatives and the privatization of the land, a very difficult situation has been created in the countryside, where there is a total lack of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, seeds, etc. Thousands of hectares have been left fallow. The little machinery that existed has either been vandalized and damaged or sold by the former bosses at cheap prices, perhaps at no little benefit to their own pockets. Under these conditions, the peasants were on the one hand happy because of the land they received, but on the other hand are now worried about what to do with it and how to use it properly. The peasants realize that the state could not help them immediately, because the previous government was powerless to help and was in the process of total collapse, while the newborn government needed time to pull itself together and to gather strength. This government, which inherited nothing from the past, was

supposed to set in motion the entire economy and to enable agriculture to function normally. What then could they do? Could they just wait? Of course not. The peasants themselves began to seek a suitable and favorable solution.

Working the land requires tractors, cultivators, fuel, selected seeds, and chemical fertilizers, and it is quite impossible in the present situation for every family to possess these things. The first solution that the peasants found was to create private agricultural production associations in the countryside that have nothing in common with the former agricultural cooperatives. They arose from the voluntary association of 15-20 or even more families, who elected a managing council, drafted a statute and a membership agreement, and registered themselves as judicial entities with bank accounts. Of course, each one of them takes the produce from his land without pooling his income, but the association helps its members with equipment, fertilizers, seeds, etc. Thus, if one family alone cannot afford to buy a tractor or another piece of equipment, 20 families may do so and may also use this machinery more fully, especially considering the small parcels of land that the peasants generally own.

This new form of organization has been practiced in such districts of the country as Kukes, Korce, Lushnje, Fier, Shkoder, Kruje, Vlore, and Pogradec, among others. More than 40 such associations have been founded so far. The positive fact is that they were immediately effective. The mass media should not be their only encouragement; the government, too, should help them as much as it is able.

The creation and operation of agricultural trading enterprises is helping these associations and private peasants in general. It is envisaged that these enterprises will open 300 shops and retail outlets; in fact, 230 have already started work. More than 170 private shops selling agricultural equipment have opened. The government should assist these shops with every means possible, ensuring that they are well supplied and keeping their retail prices under control in accordance with the law.

Assessment of Visegrad Three-EC Relationship

92CH0657A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
4 Jun 92 p 15

[Article by Janos Martonyi, Foreign Ministry state secretary: "Maastricht and Visegrad; To Join—When and How?"]

[Text] A crucial question and a turning point in Hungary's fate is when, on what conditions, after what preparations, and with what consequences the country might become and will become a member of the European Community, an organization that represents the unity of Europe and, in spite of the many crises that it has outlasted, is still growing stronger and larger, or, rather, the European Union, which is going to replace the EC.

The slogan "back to Europe," by now a commonplace, has become nearly synonymous with our full membership in the EC. EC membership is also a central element in the goals of Hungarian foreign policy and foreign trade. It is indisputable that a national consensus has been achieved on the basic question. However, there are discussions about the when and how, although some views have not yet been articulated precisely enough.

There is no true strategic alternative to joining the European Union, especially seeing that we regard all dimensions of integration, that is to say, cooperation in the areas of economics, politics, and defense, as unified and we cannot look for a solution that would mean progress in one or the other area alone. The conceptions of the necessary or possible time for joining are fairly divergent both at home and among the member states of the EC. Concerning the opinion at home, the sentiment is heard more and more frequently that a "fast, premature" membership would mean a huge shock to the unprepared Hungarian economy and would bring with it more damage than advantages. In the broadening climate of anxiety about the shock an EC membership would mean for the Hungarian economy, it was refreshing to hear the communique by the National Alliance of Enterprises which, on the one hand, labeled the government's decision to submit an application for membership only after coordinating this with the Visegrad Three a serious mistake and, on the other hand, expressed the conviction that Hungary could become a member of the EC in two years, together with Austria. One can only rejoice in the increased confidence of some entrepreneurs; however, their goal is obviously unrealistic today, because Hungary will unfortunately only have an opportunity to join after a considerably longer period of time.

The "Shock" Argument

Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that the shock of membership is receiving greater emphasis than necessary, and in fact is indirectly nurturing foreign statements which use the argument of Hungary's unpreparedness as a pretext for postponing into the more distant future the Middle European extension of the EC.

The argument about a "shock" should not be overemphasized, not only because it falls back on us, but also because in this form it is not true. When we signed the agreement of association, we already accepted the dismantling of restrictions on the influx of foreign goods according to a predetermined timetable. The circle will be enlarged further by free trade agreements with the countries of the EFTA [European Free Trade Association], as well as with Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics. As the process of association progresses and as the free trade agreements are gradually implemented, the bulk of imports will reach the Hungarian market free of duties and restrictions on quantity, regardless of when we become full-fledged members of the Community. Of course, the danger of the shock of integration is present even apart from this, not only as a consequence of the freedom of service, trade, and the movement of capital, but also due to the pressure to adopt the entire regulatory system of integration. However, it is precisely this pressure which will guarantee the speedy achievement of our most important goals for the transformation of Hungary's economy and society. The shock of integration would only pose a true difficulty for us if the opportunity of membership arose, due to some miraculous developments, within two or three years.

Together or...

Unfortunately, this will not be the case. The EC extension strategy under preparation will, of course, not name the time, but it will make it clear that a Middle European extension will have to be separated from an extension to members of the EFTA, which will be relatively unproblematic, and it follows from this that a membership for these countries will only be possible in the last years of the decade. One must also see that there are many who would gladly postpone this moment even further, and although they do not say this openly, they count on the fact that the well-meaning excuse of unpreparedness can always be used for further delay. The less developed member countries are worried about their present financial advantages, amounting to several billion per year, and the richer countries are worried about the increase in financial means necessary for this purpose.

A question related to the time of membership, but in fact more complicated and more important from the point of view of the strategy of Hungarian foreign policy, is whether Hungary will build its membership strategy on its own, will determine each step leading to it on its own, and will attempt to become a member of the European Union on its own at the earliest possible moment, or whether it will accept the community of interests within at least a part of the Middle European region, and will accordingly coordinate its membership strategy and the concrete steps leading to membership with the other countries of the region. Obviously, the countries included in the Visegrad Three are understood to be the other countries of the region.

The cooperation of the Visegrad Three reflects, in fact, nothing other than a definite purpose to change the

cultural, historical, and geographical reality of Middle Europe into a political and economic reality. These are interdependent countries with a common fate and common interests, and economic and political cooperation among them will considerably facilitate and promote the achievement of their most fundamental national objectives, the modernization of their economies and societies, and their harmonious and relatively quick conformation to an integrated Europe. It is equally important that this cooperation prevent the rebirth of traditional antagonisms, as this occurred between the two world wars. This danger must not be underestimated, especially in view of the increased nationalism in the region.

It is very important for us to demonstrate the role and the importance of Middle Europe's special contribution to European integration. The issue is not only that "the present geographical distribution of the Twelve is absurd from the point of view of both economy and politics" (Ralf Dahrendorf)—or to put it differently, that it is absurd to talk about a united Europe which leaves out, say, Vienna, Prague, Krakow, or Budapest—but also that in the present distinctive historical situation the countries of Middle Europe provide a particular asset.

Halfheartedly

The Visegrad Three does not question for a moment the complete acceptance of this *finalite politique* [political finality], the understanding that the alpha and omega, the origin and final destination of European integration is a politically united Europe. This political goal initiated the entire undertaking, and now that the foundation of economic integration has been created, the time has come for Europe to return to the starting point and make the critical decisions necessary for the creation of a united Europe. In Maastricht these decisions were only made in a lopsided and halfhearted manner, because the political union remained largely within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation. But making these decisions in a consistent manner cannot be postponed for long, and it must be clearly determined whether in the next millennium Europe wishes to live basically in the structure of sovereign national states or in a unified structure based on the division of sovereignty and on the concept of a real community. Middle Europe is simply indispensable to this difficult birth. Its historic experiences and tragedies motivate it to step out of the power logistics of national states and divert national aspirations to the areas of economic and cultural achievements while guaranteeing national identities.

Proving our commitment to Europe will, of course, not be so simple in practice, since we were speaking earlier about values rather than everyday realities. For this very reason we must consider what the acceptance not only of the *finalite politique*, but also of the *acquis communautaire* [communal experience] will mean to us, and what the incorporation of these principles into our economic, legal, and institutional system at home will mean. We must assess exactly the distance, the steps to be taken,

the sacrifices to be brought, the external and internal hurdles to be passed wherever they are to be found, be they in the economy, in the legal system, or even in our own way of thinking. For instance, if we make up our minds to gradually begin, voluntarily and autonomously, to adopt the so-called derivative right of the European Community, doing in other words what the countries of the EFTA, which signed an agreement on 2 May 1992 on creating the European Economic Region, committed themselves to do, then we must carry out the huge task of regulating the areas of consumer protection, welfare, environmental protection, and countless other areas, and at the same time we must accept the resulting financial burdens, as well.

Thus, we must take every possible step, we must use every means at our disposal, in order to achieve full membership as soon as possible. At the same time, we must examine the criteria and conditions by which the Community wishes to measure the success of our process of transformation and the degree of our readiness for integration.

The Conditions

Determining the criteria for joining would actually be in the interests of both parties. For the party wishing to join, it would clarify the requirements to be met, and at the same time it would guarantee for the Community that the countries on the outside could not lay unfounded claims to membership. If, however, we make acceptance dependent solely on the discretionary deliberations of the acceptor, i.e., if we regard it as a unilateral act, then such guarantees are not necessary. But joining the Community cannot be regarded as such a unilateral decision, either from a political or from a legal point of view, since in principle the EC must be open to all European countries. The criteria are connected basically with the essence and quality of the political and economic system of the candidate countries and cannot be quantified exactly. As far as the political conditions are concerned, the issue is, first and foremost, the already mentioned commitment to Europe and to a value system, the unconditional acceptance of which is essential for the complete fulfillment of responsibilities inherent in membership and for the functioning of the Community. The value system and the aspirations of the country in question must be compatible with the image of a Europe of the future which already today determines the shape of integration. Instead of confrontation, one needs cooperation; instead of intolerance, tolerance; and instead of the extreme assertion of one's own interests, a readiness for compromise.

Critical Point

Economic criteria are also relatively easy to determine. The country wishing to join must obviously possess a functioning market economy in which the development of market mechanisms has reached the critical threshold which is indispensable for the transnational liberation of the elements of production. In this economy, private

ownership must play a dominant role (all the more so because in its absence the most important political condition, a lasting political democracy, cannot be implemented either), and the national currency must have attained a degree of convertibility which is essential for the free movement of goods, services, persons, and capital. The emphasis is on qualitative compatibility and not on the level of economic development. These criteria must be distinguished from the expanding elements of the *acquis communautaire*—namely, as long as the qualitative criteria of joining remain unchanged, and this is what guarantees security for both parties, the *acquis communautaire* changes wherever appropriate, and the country wishing to join must obviously accept and adapt the prevailing system. The same is true for criteria concerning institutions and law. The legal system must qualitatively be able to incorporate European law, both the directly applicable regulations and the guiding principles to be applied by national legislation, and in such a way that this would not disrupt the internal unity and harmony of the legal system.

The supreme goal of our domestic strategy of integration is the earliest possible accelerated compliance with the system of criteria for membership. The road which can successfully lead us to membership in the European Union is the considerable acceleration and integration of the domestic process of adaptation into the framework of a comprehensive strategy. Of course, this road will not be smooth; we will have many disputes with each other and with outsiders as well. But the fundamental goals must be clarified, and we must come to an agreement on the major points that can serve as a common denominator in our disputes.

Discussion on National Defense, Security Policy

Kodolanyi Interviewed

92CH0685A Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 27 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Gyula Kodolanyi, Prime Minister Antall's foreign policy adviser, by Jozsef Martin; place and date not given: "Hungarian Security Policy (Part 4): Nationalities Charter for Europe, Says Under Secretary Gyula Kodolanyi"]

[Text] *The signing of a mutual airspace surveillance agreement between NATO and the Visegrad Three is imminent. This accord is part of the ongoing process by which our country embraces the Atlantic region's system of political and economic interests. If Czechoslovakia is still split after the country holds elections, we hope both the Czechs and Slovaks are sufficiently realistic, and in that case we can speak of a Visegrad Four, not Three. After an initial confusion of roles, the opposition recognized that in foreign and security policy it must try to cooperate with the government, said Under Secretary Gyula Kodolanyi (50), foreign policy adviser to the prime minister, in the interview with which we conclude our series on Hungarian security policy.*

[Martin] A notable Western politician, in the person of John Major, visited the Visegrad Three countries for the first time this week. Does this mean international acknowledgment of the three countries and the Central European zone?

[Kodolanyi] To my knowledge, the British prime minister added that trip to his itinerary at the last minute, and the decision was clearly linked to the fact that in a few weeks it will be Great Britain's turn to assume the office of Presidency of the European Community. I would like to use Jozsef Antall's favorite phrase in connection with the Visegrad Three: The prime minister is in the habit of saying that the three countries are a club. Not a bloc and not an alliance, but a group of countries whose internal and external features match in many ways and whose foreign policy goals are similar. We hope that wholesome economic cooperation can evolve. The emergence and stabilization of democratic institutions occurred earliest in these three states. And because, as I said, the three countries form a club—I might call it a reconciliation forum—no one can take aim against them. In no way does Hungarian foreign policy seek to hinder its neighbors—not Ukraine, not Romania—from participating in European integration or from joining European organizations. Indeed, a tenet of our foreign policy is that Hungary must act as mediator and build bridges between East and West, North and South.

Will the Federation Survive?

[Martin] The Yugoslav war fundamentally altered the fate of the Pentagonal and later the Hexagonal. How will the Czechoslovakian elections, which may open the way for an independent Slovakia, affect the future of the Visegrad Three?

[Kodolanyi] I think that in this case there are enough political realists among the Czechs and Slovaks for us to be able to speak of the Visegrad Four. Yet we hope—and we notice that the efforts of European policymakers point in this direction—that the federation is not split into two countries after the elections. Of course, it's impossible to predict.

[Martin] In recent months there has been a kind of proliferation of international organizations. Present alongside NATO and the CSCE is the West European Union (WEU), the EC's military core. In this context, how do you view the external safeguards of our security?

[Kodolanyi] In recent months, events have undoubtedly gathered speed, which means the Helsinki summit conference is approaching. It would seem that ideas are starting to take shape despite various disputes. Most countries understand it would not be especially fortunate if the protective barrier were built outside the CSCE. That would really amount to doing it in duplicate or, in a certain sense, in triplicate. Gathering more and more strength among the European members of NATO is the view that the WEU is a supplement to NATO, not a parallel organization. Empowered by the CSCE, both

must lend themselves to performing tasks of crisis management. Both the war in Yugoslavia and the battles that have erupted on former Soviet territory suggest what kind of security policy the new Europe needs.

[Martin] You stated on one recent occasion that from the viewpoint of security a relationship similar to that between Sweden and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has evolved between our country and NATO. How is this "Swedish" status to be understood?

[Kodolanyi] It means that in a bipolar Europe NATO would not tolerate an act of aggression against Sweden, even though the Scandinavian country lies outside the zone of activity defined in the NATO charter. During the past two years, Hungary and, I think, the Visegrad Three's other two members have developed complex cultural, political, and economic relations with NATO, and this pertains to institutions as well. These relations evolved naturally and spontaneously. I think that even though we cannot speak of formal safeguards, our security situation has really changed.

"Swedish" Status

[Martin] Let us return to the Swedish analogy. Am I to understand that if our country is attacked, then NATO will not stand idly by?

[Kodolanyi] I don't believe I should make predictions, and I think we are and were witness to sufficient Western hesitation. There is no doubt, however, that today our country is part of the Atlantic zone's system of political and economic interests.

[Martin] Americans are members of NATO. At this moment, the WEU is just a formal organization that consists of a recently revived French-German army corps, but this union is an emphatically European organization. From the viewpoint of Hungarian security policy, does there exist a European line—there is such a trend in the EC—and an Atlantic line?

[Kodolanyi] It would be extremely unfortunate if we assumed the role of arbitrator in this debate. Despite the fact that a new world is taking shape around us, it cannot be said that the factors which threaten stability have disappeared. Therefore, in the long run, a significant American presence is needed in Europe. We cannot separate European integration and transatlantic thought, and I think that they are divergent processes. Which trend will gather headway and when, which factors will be decisive and how, that we cannot foresee.

[Martin] Just as it is necessary to prepare for EC membership, in all likelihood we will need to devote much time to preparation for WEU or NATO. This is perhaps more important than precisely which year the inevitable connection is made. Do you agree?

[Kodolanyi] Yes, clearly. Rapprochement with NATO means, for example, that gradually and as quickly as possible the Hungarian defense system must switch over

to technology that dovetails with Western systems. The first steps are under way: establishment of a mutual airspace surveillance system between NATO and the Visegrad Three is imminent. We have also signed bilateral agreements with many countries, including the United States, concerning various levels of cooperation in training and technical aid, for instance. These many small steps gradually add up to rapprochement.

Halt the Yugoslav War

[Martin] The world was startled to note—but essentially reconciled itself to—the powerlessness displayed by international institutions and organizations in the case of the Yugoslav war.

[Kodolanyi] What the international community has achieved thus far in arbitration, crisis management, and crisis prevention is insufficient. Events will probably impel countries of the world to act much more unitedly and assertively than they have so far. If battles continue to flare, it not only poisons the atmosphere but also threatens European stability, integration, and cooperation. I believe it is the task of international organizations to develop a system of explicit criteria for maintaining peace, managing crises, and preventing conflicts. In this connection we consider it essential to approve a European nationalities charter as soon as possible. After all, these disputes are always of ethnic origin. If in this charter democratic countries that possess traversable boundaries satisfactorily define the legal status of nationalities and adopt the agreement, then we can eradicate the sources of crisis. If we are unsuccessful, we may plunge back into the world as it was at the start of the century, and everything we have achieved so far will be called into question.

Suitable Atmosphere With Bucharest

[Martin] But this also depends on how we get along with our neighbors. And rapprochement with NATO, the EC, and the WEU is probably no substitute for good neighborly relations.

[Kodolanyi] Purely international law is one aspect of this issue. Yet the legal paragraphs become political reality only if a suitable atmosphere develops. But the actors themselves create this atmosphere, and when we speak about it, everyone in our country thinks of Romania. We would like to establish a suitable atmosphere with Bucharest.

[Martin] The minorities question lies at the heart of Hungarian foreign policy. Nowadays we have many allies—from Russians to Swedes and even Austrians—who applaud our international efforts in this area. During a specific era of our foreign policy prior to the change of regime, we ran the risk of having our international activity undergo a unidimensional analysis, namely, from the viewpoint of class struggle. In our present geopolitical situation is the analysis unidimensional or multidimensional?

[Kodolanyi] I believe that the era itself, not Hungarian foreign policy, brings the minorities or nationalities question into focus. By removing the large lid from these countries, the identity crisis erupted with powerful force. This is a positive phenomenon, for example, in Hungary where self-determination by a minority community exists within a constitutional framework. But the process runs into serious difficulty where this framework is absent or where extremist political forces exploit feelings aroused by the pursuit of identity. However, Hungarian foreign policy is based not only on the minorities question but also on the principle of European cooperation and on the hope that in all bilateral and other relations our continent will be characterized by diversity and widespread rapprochement. Something similar to this actually developed during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. We believe in a continent whose distinctive feature is free movement, where otherness is respected, and which is typified by an intellectual outlook. Maybe this is utopia, but if there was a utopia once, why couldn't there be one again?

[Martin] The government and the opposition work together at several stages during the formulation of foreign and domestic policy. Collapse of the Soviet Union made it necessary to revamp the previous concept. In what sort of atmosphere is this work performed, and how do you view the opposition's role?

[Kodolanyi] I consider it a very positive sign that, after the initial confusion of roles—here, for example, I am thinking of the sale of weapons to Croatia—the opposition recognized that foreign policy is discussed differently from expressly domestic issues. To put it bluntly, international activity is a realm where one must try to cooperate with the government within a certain framework. I think that this mentality develops little by little, step by step, with an argument now and then.

[Martin] Maybe the latter is not such a bad thing, after all. In recent weeks and months, for example, it became quite clear in Bonn and Vienna that there were differences of opinion between the chancellor and foreign minister on current and specific issues.

[Kodolanyi] There may be disputes, of course, but the forum for those disputes must be chosen. I think that in the life of a nation there are troublesome moments when certain ideas can receive only limited publicity. In the United States, for example, the President is at liberty to inform the appropriate congressional committee when a military action is scheduled to occur, but this information does not leak out to the press. I think that when we reach maturity in the international arena, the opposition parties, whom we can rely on to a greater degree than before, may be drawn into the discussions of Hungarian foreign policy.

Congressional Hearing

92CH0685B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 3 Jun 92 pp 1, 5

[Article by Zs.N.: "Military Legislation in Forefront"]

[Text] At a joint news conference yesterday, Defense Minister Lajos Fur and Colonel General Kalman Lorincz, commander of the Hungarian army, laid out the army's balance sheet for the past two years. From what they said there emerged a picture of the positive and negative trends and events that characterize the army in particular and the country as a whole.

After the change of regime, army leaders assumed a twofold task: preserving the stability of the armed forces and outlining the short-term and long-term process of transformation and modernization.

Our army did not avail itself of military diplomacy before, but today the idea is accepted. Far-reaching changes in international politics have generated a new system of military policy and foreign contact that was previously unknown in our land and in Europe. The pillars are bilateral military relations, and we must concern ourselves first and foremost with immediate neighbors. As everyone knows, suggested Lajos Fur, a long series of treaties similar to the first agreement we signed with Romania followed. It is very regrettable that we have not managed to establish comparable military links with Yugoslavia or Little Yugoslavia. In the latter case, however, responsibility does not fall on Hungarian shoulders. Nowadays, bilateral relations extend to not only most of Europe but also America and even Japan.

The relationship with NATO is, of course, especially important to our country. The relationship must become steady and systematic; membership is a secondary issue. Since creation of the North Atlantic Cooperative Council, our relationship has been so smooth that we will soon have a suitable level of representation at NATO headquarters. Recent events have made it important to systematize the smaller European centers of crisis and, where possible, prevent conflicts.

The West European Union [WEU] assumes a prominent role in security policy. The WEU serves as a supplement to, and does not curtail the increased importance of, NATO. The reason WEU exists may be the ambitions of France and Germany, who want to develop the union into a kind of security agency. In this spirit, the Hungarian government was invited to a June 19th conference in Bonn, where the WEU's role in security issues will be debated.

Army Regulation

According to the defense minister, the inadequacy of military legislation must be faced. In keeping with the practice of bourgeois democracies, we must enact substantial laws that offer security to soldiers and assure the country a deployable army. A bill of basic army principles has already been submitted to parliament.

Increasingly important to the Hungarian army is the so-called army law. The idea behind it was recently approved by the Defense Ministry and the Hungarian army leaders. After the requisite administrative steps, the bill will probably come before Parliament this autumn. Parallel to it, another basic law, the service or officer law, will be addressed. The latter regulates the rights, status, and advancement possibilities for professional staff. It offers a significant long-term outlook for professional officers. Preparation of armed service regulations is still to come: probably by the end of this year or the start of next year, at the latest.

Under Subsistence Level

The defense minister said that as a result of various reduction programs over the past year, the number of soldiers in the army today is about 100,000. Some argue that this number is adequate; others, that it is too low. It is important to note that a cutback in army strength is not peculiar to Hungary, but a general phenomenon throughout the world. In the United States, for example, the armed forces will be reduced by 1 million in the next few years. This trend is a direct result of the end of the dichotomous world system, a joint military lesson of the Gulf War. It can be said in general that every country in the northern hemisphere is seriously concerned with reducing the size of its army by 30-50 percent. In view of the number of Hungarian inhabitants, the size of our armed forces is adequate.

For well-known reasons the defense budget is far from desirable, although more aid is vitally important for the transformation. It is very dangerous in the long run, emphasized the minister, that in our country improvements take a back seat to maintenance—contrary to internationally accepted practice. In short, hardly anything is spent on improvements. There is no possibility of introducing new technology. Serious tension has arisen because of the professional staff's socioeconomic status. Nearly one-third of the commissioned officers, warrant officers, and civilian employees live at or below the subsistence level. It cannot remain this way for long. This is the reason the number of those who leave the service is so high, but it is encouraging that the trend has slowed down this year.

Finally, Lajos Fur called attention to the importance of improved officer training, where special emphasis is placed on the broader mastery of world languages. The long-term officer training program will be ready by 1993 and will hopefully increase the prestige of professional officers.

Transformation, New Tasks

Concerning the army's role, Colonel General Kalman Lorincz said that, in keeping with worldwide practice, the task of our soldiers is conflict prevention, conflict management, and defense in the classic sense. The transformation process must occur according to this sequence, but in such a way that the capacity of the army

to function is not impaired. Our army is characterized by both change and stability. After all, the changes introduced in our country affect the armed forces, too. It is no wonder that the past two years have been distinguished by many cases of conflict and crisis management. The most disruptive changes have occurred, most of the reorganization is over with, and the issue of high-level leadership has been solved.

In answer to a question, Lajos Fur repeated that under no circumstances would our soldiers participate in the Balkan conflict.

Challenge to President's Appointing Power

Coalition Statement

92CH0671A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
26 May 92 p 4

[Statement issued by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Christian Democratic People's Party, and the Independent Smallholders Party: "Proposed National Assembly Statement by the Three Parties"]

[Text] In rejecting the prime minister's recommendation, the president of the Republic refused to relieve of his duties the president of the Hungarian Radio, who has gravely violated the Constitution by setting himself against a National Assembly committee having jurisdiction. Imbued by a sense of responsibility to ensure that constitutional order prevails, and to preserve parliamentary democracy as generally agreed upon and as provided for by the Constitution, the National Assembly makes the following statement:

Statement

Executive power is exercised in the Hungarian Republic by a government accountable to the National Assembly.

Paragraph 1 Section (1) of Law No. 52 of 1990 states that "Acting upon the recommendation of the prime minister, the president of the Republic shall appoint and relieve of their duties the presidents and vice presidents of the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television, as well as the chairman and president of the Hungarian Telegraphic Office [MTI news agency] after a public hearing of these persons before the National Assembly Committee on Cultural and Press Affairs." Paragraph 1 Section (2) states that "The prime minister's countersignature is required for the president of the Republic to exercise the authority specified in Section (1)."

The president of the Republic may refuse to act consistently with a proposal that falls within the scope of the prime minister's legal authority and is submitted to him by the prime minister only if "he has substantial grounds to believe that acting consistently with the proposal would gravely disturb the democratic functioning of the state organization," as stated in Constitutional Court decision No. 48 of 26 September 1991.

In his letter dated 19 May 1992 the president of the Republic has refused to accept the prime minister's proposal, indicating that compliance with the prime minister's proposal would gravely disturb the democratic state organization because it would "violate the freedom of the press." The president's letter, however, has fallen short of explaining what "substantial grounds" have justified this grave supposition. The reference contained in the statement of the head of state does not satisfy the requirement of having to explain the substantial grounds upon which his refusal is based.

As part of exercising its government operations oversight authority, the National Assembly finds that the action proposed by the prime minister does not endanger the freedom of the press, and therefore the reference made to the disturbance of the democratic functioning of the state organization lacks all foundation. To the contrary, considering the conduct of the president of the Hungarian Radio before the National Assembly committee having jurisdiction—a conduct that has flown in the face of the Constitution—the government's failure to propose the immediate dismissal of the president of the Hungarian Radio would have amounted to the government's grave failure to act.

Paragraph 35 Section (1) Subsection (a) of the Constitution mandates the government to protect the constitutional order. The president of the Hungarian Radio had questioned the authority of the National Assembly Committee on Culture, Education, Science, Sports, Television, and the Press, and had left the hearing without being discharged. In doing so, the president of the Hungarian Radio had failed to perform his duty mandated by Paragraph 21 Section (3) of the Constitution, and by asserting that the Committee had no jurisdiction, he had challenged the institutional system of the parliamentary democracy. Accordingly, the prime minister not only possessed legal authority to initiate proceedings to remove the executive deemed to be unfit to perform his function, but would also have failed to perform his constitutional duty, had he not proposed the executive's immediate relief of his duties in this situation.

Paragraph 29 Section (1) of the Constitution provides that it is the duty of the president of the Republic to guard over the democratic functioning of the state organization. In light of conduct manifested by the president of the Hungarian Radio in violation of the Constitution, the head of state could have performed this duty only by relieving the president of the Hungarian Radio of his duties, effective immediately.

Moved by a deep concern that the course taken by the head of state might endanger parliamentary democracy, the National Assembly calls upon president of the Republic Arpad Goncz to exercise his authority at all times consistent with the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic.

[signed] Dr. Tibor Fuzessy
Dr. Imre Konya
Dr. Gyula Pasztor

Debreczeni's Commentary

92CH0671B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
26 May 92 p 11

[Article by Jozsef Debreczeni, parliamentary representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum: "The King Has No Clothes"]

[Text] Unimpaired presidential authority is not just a concept that stands by itself. It provides the most important assurance for the first citizen of the Republic to be able to perform his constitutional role summarized in the basic law as follows: "The president of the Republic shall convey a sense of national unity, and shall guard over the democratic functioning of the state organization." Presidential prestige must be destroyed, if used for a different, or for the opposite, purpose.

To this date, Arpad Goncz has not understood—has not wanted to understand, or has not been permitted to understand—that Hungary is a parliamentary democracy. Hungary is a parliamentary democracy in which the National Assembly exercises legislative powers, the government exercises executive powers, and in which (and these once again are words taken from the Constitution) "the president is not entitled to exercise either legislative or executive powers." His role is symbolic and must be performed above partisan interests. He cannot be held to account by parliament, he cannot be questioned, and no "no-confidence" motion can be entered against him: Lacking political power he has no political responsibility.

Arpad Goncz has not understood the essence of the role he has been assigned to play. He has not understood that the actions of the president of the Republic must not be guided by a personal sense of justice, by private political convictions or by a subjective sense of morality, but primarily and above all, by the concept of legality. He must not become the "hero of the press," he is only the guardian of the Constitution. And by no means should he be the former in spite of the latter. If his sense of justice, political credo or sense of morality clash with constitutional standards, and if his conscience is unable to tolerate such conflict, he has only one way out: to resign his office. I do believe that he and the political forces supportive of him are convinced that the prime minister and the ruling parties are intent on taking over the radio and the television. Nevertheless, the president has no function in this regard, as long as such steps are taken within the limits of laws in force. No sense of political justice can be represented by illegal means. The beginning of the apocalypse of the constitutional state sets in when the first citizen of the Republic uses such means.

In the course of his functioning, Arpad Goncz has repeatedly transgressed the limits of his constitutional authority, he has repeatedly used illegal means.

He has done so for the first time when the democratic order of the state had been shaken in a thus far most dramatic way, during the taxi blockade. In a statement issued on the eve of 27 October 1990 ("I have proposed to the government to...suspend its actions relative to gasoline price increases") he has strayed from the path of nonpartisanship and neutrality in an effort to resolve the crisis—an appropriate purpose if viewed in itself. While he had not uttered a single word about the illegal character of the actions taken by one party, he had called upon the other party to accept his position.

He called upon that party to accept his position, which made a political mistake at most, but which certainly did nothing illegal. Understandably, the taxi drivers regarded Arpad Goncz's appeal as a statement supportive of their cause; after that, their leaders did not dare to sign a just-completed agreement. Willingly or unwillingly, the presidential *deus ex machina* had rearranged the dramatic sphere of power a moment before the impending final outcome, thus deepening the conflict once again by moving the action on the path of new, grave complications, which also held out the promise of a possibly tragic final outcome. Thereafter Arpad Goncz appealed to the army to stay inside its barracks. (He did so with an appreciable sense for dramatic settings, but once again transgressing his jurisdiction in a legally unacceptable manner.) The barely veiled content of the announcement was as follows: The government intends to deploy the military against unarmed "citizens."

In the days of the Visegrad meeting, the president had demonstrated for the second time that he had not been clearly aware of his own legal status, or that he had not been satisfied with the status he had. Due to the public law systems of Poland and Czechoslovakia that are entirely different from the Hungarian public law system, and due to the roles played by Walesa and Havel, the president's efforts, augmented by a heavy press campaign (which caused embarrassing complications insofar as protocol was concerned), were well suited to create false semblances and to mislead a public uninformed with respect to constitutional issues.

The fact that Arpad Goncz views his assigned functions as an authorization to make decisions and to exercise power, has been demonstrated for the third time in conflicts surrounding the leadership of the army, and later, in the framework of the president's rejection of the appointment of media vice presidents. No longer manageable by political means after the president's action, the problem had been referred to the Constitutional Court. Stunning differences between the contents of the president's letter to the Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Court decision served to unmistakably prove that Arpad Goncz's perception of his own legal status and constitutional role fundamentally differed

from the Constitutional Court's interpretation, an interpretation that provided a legal standard applicable to everyone. Let me recite only the three most important differences:

1. Goncz talks about "a separation between the jurisdictions of the president of the Republic and the government within the executive branch of power." In contrast, this is what the Constitutional Court had to say: "The government exclusively possesses...and exercises executive power," "the president is outside of the executive branch of power...."

2. Goncz believes that "the responsibility borne for his decisions is of a legal character." The Constitutional Court, on the other hand, had this to say: "Legal responsibilities have a different character than political responsibilities; the two types of responsibilities are mutually independent. The legal responsibility of the president of the Republic must in no way be used to compensate for his lack of political responsibility."

3. According to Goncz: "It follows from his legal status of being the commander in chief that the president of the Republic is also the superior of the commander in chief of the Honved forces in the chain of command." In contrast, the highest body interpreting the law made clear that "The function of the president of the Republic as the commander in chief is a constitutional function, and is not...a position or a rank. Accordingly, the commander in chief is not a superior in the chain of command of any of the armed forces."

This was the fourth instance in which Arpad Goncz revealed his unfitness. Thereafter Goncz went on to say that "henceforth" he would continue to exercise his authority according to the Constitution and his conscience, "just as he did before." Just as he did before!

Fifth, and finally: the Gombar affair. Arpad Goncz has refused to dismiss the president of the radio. The Constitutional Court decision cannot be misunderstood: The president of the Republic may so decide "if he has substantial reason to believe that acting consistent with the proposal would gravely disturb the democratic functioning of the state organization." To do so, "the arguments must weigh as heavily as those required for convening the National Assembly into a special session or for dissolving the National Assembly." The Constitution states that the president may dissolve the National Assembly if, as a result of the actions taken by the National Assembly, there is no government, i.e., no executive power exists; and he may convene a special session of the National Assembly if a state of war exists, or war threatens, or in emergency situations. Does anyone in this country believe that the government would collapse, that war would break out, and that an emergency situation would have to be proclaimed in Hungary if Hungarian Radio Vice President Laszlo Csucs, appointed by Arpad Goncz, temporarily took the place of Csaba Gombar, also appointed by Arpad Goncz, as the head of the Radio?

Well, there is someone who believes in this: Arpad Goncz. To top it off, the president of the Hungarian Republic took this position—nonsensical and unconstitutional as it is, to say the least—in defense of a person who had ruled himself out as a potential appointee based on criteria established by the Law on Appointments and the Constitution, by calling unfit the parliamentary committee that was supposed to hear him, and by characterizing the proceeding as a “political ado” and a “racket.” (Paragraph 21 Section (3) of the Constitution has this to say: “Upon request by National Assembly committees, all persons so requested shall submit data to, and shall testify before such committees.”) Here we have the president as the protector of the radio president, who stands in violation of both the law and the Constitution, refusing to dismiss him in violation of the Constitution! Does every Jack find his Jill? No. Unfortunately, the situation is far more serious. This is no joke and no game: By taking this step Arpad Goncz has become absurd in a political sense. In vain does the opposition pin its hopes to an inability to forge a legally required two-thirds majority required to initiate the president’s removal from office. Even the support of a simple majority of such a proposal raises unpredictable consequences, or, one could also say, the consequences are rather predictable. How could the president convey a sense of “national unity” if viewed by a majority of the Hungarian National Assembly, an institution representing the nation’s will, as having violated the Constitution, and deprived of the National Assembly’s confidence? A president like this could not retain his place in any republic in the world.

Arpad Goncz is not an independent personality. He is committed to the opposition, he is the puppet of a radical-liberal political group. This kind of politics, although an indispensable component of democracy in a constitutional state, a component that serves as an overly sensitive seismograph to detect threats lurking around democracy, cannot ever serve as the foundation for national politics anywhere, and cannot become the common denominator for a national consensus. Anyone tied to this kind of politics cannot be fit to serve as president of the Republic either.

And now I will have to say some brutal and painful things, but occasionally the time comes when brutal and painful things must be said. Arpad Goncz is struggling with an increasingly deepening confusion concerning legitimacy and his own personality. He is aware, of course, that he had not been elected by either the people or the parliament. He had been selected by the prime minister. He was only one item on the balance sheet of the pact agreed to by the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]. This then creates a psychological situation akin to the one experienced by a poor fellow marrying into a wealthy family. It causes a constant inferiority complex, a sickly oversensitivity, and a need to compensate for all this; a constant state of suspicion and a sense of being offended: the prime minister wants me to play a background role;

he uses me as a tool; he humiliates me and tramples me into the mud. It creates a spasmodic desire and endeavor to prove himself: the people love me, the people trust me. And somewhere in the depths of the soul there emerges a doubt: This TV commercial, boulevard press popularity of Uncle Arpi [nickname for Arpad], the grandfather, amounts to no more than the popularity of “any laundry detergent....”

This nation is witnessing historic times in which fortunes turn and people are being tested. The weight of each of us is now becoming obvious. I am not afraid to say: Arpad Goncz has been weighed, and has been found to be a light weight.

I am not afraid to say it: The king is naked.

Court Secrecy Explained

92CH0671C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
27 May 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: “Why Is the Antall Petition a Secret? Dr. Andras Hollo’s Statement to This Newspaper”]

[Text] A petition in which Jozsef Antall, the head of the government, asked some questions from the Constitutional Court following the president’s rejection of Antall’s decision to relieve the president of the radio from his duties, has already been discussed at yesterday’s session of the Court. As Constitutional Court Executive Secretary Andras Hollo told this newspaper: The Constitutional Court justices will decide at next Monday’s full session of the Court whether to address the merits of the proposal. The Constitutional Court is doing its job, they are going to hand down a decision as soon as one is prepared, the executive secretary said. In response to a question Andras Hollo ruled out the possibility that the Court would jointly respond to the prime minister’s petition and to one submitted by Alajos Dornbach two weeks ago; at most, the two petitions could be analyzed jointly. This approach was justified by claiming that the Dornbach petition pertained to the establishment of after-the-fact legal standards, while the prime minister’s questions required the interpretation of the Constitution. The executive secretary stressed that since the Public Affairs Office of the Prime Minister had not made public the prime minister’s questions, the Constitutional Court would not make public the contents of the petition either. Finally, we learned that a decision may be handed down in June relative to this issue of great interest.

Boross on Former, Present Interior Ministries

92CH0675B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 19 May 92 p 6

[Unattributed interview with Minister of the Interior Peter Boross; place and date not given: “This Interior Ministry Is Not That Interior Ministry”]

[Text] *Laws are very important; they have been established, but a change in outlook and mentality is at least as important for the Ministry of the Interior to perform its new functions as having laws. Peter Boross preferred to talk about forgetting the troublesome heritage and about the new profile that is taking shape as part of the employees' consciousness.*

[Boross] We must always take into consideration that this is that certain Interior Ministry. This is the Interior Ministry that, for 40 years, has acquired a certain character in the public mind. This is the police ministry directed by the party. And these are the workers in this building, who represent a certain spirit. This is how the public mind has registered the ministry, and it did so for some good reasons. It is very important for us to convey a sense that this Interior Ministry is not that Interior Ministry, both in terms of form and substance. From the standpoint of form, a decisive part of the ministry is dealing with government administration. What had been the so-called Office of Councils before, was transferred to the Interior Ministry, and this is consistent with Hungarian traditions. Accordingly, this ministry is fundamentally responsible for the internal office organization of the country, for government administration. It is well known that Hungary was distinguished from the Balkan states by its developed government organization system. This represents noble traditions, and the adherence to such traditions. Another matter concerning form: Fundamentally, the employees in this building are civilians, not police officers.

The other, very essential matter is that other organizations under the Interior Ministry, specifically the enforcement organizations—the police and the border guards—were rearranged in new battle lines. I mean this in terms of outlook, to enable these organizations to perform their functions in this country under the changed geopolitical conditions. From the standpoint of both organizations, this means the protection of borders, and restrictive actions regarding the influx of aliens. I feel that we have satisfied these requirements beginning in the second half of 1991, after some hesitation. Due to the growing crime rate, it was our fundamental duty to restore a sense of self-assuredness in, and an ability to act by the police, as well as stability after the reorganization. I believe that we took a great step also in this regard. Some important changes have taken place in the outlook of our policemen. This police is no longer a timid organization that puts things off and hesitates. And most importantly, it is no longer the organization that took action on 15 March 1988. It is characterized by acting in the spirit of the new functions. This was not a matter of having appropriate legal provisions. It flowed from the changed spirit of this ministry. It was a methodical change in the leadership of the ministry, if you will. We are particularly pleased with the fact that we are receiving an ever-increasing number of requests from the populace and prefectures for more policemen. This not only indicates a deteriorating state of public security, but also the fact that our two-year effort has been successful. Public confidence in the police is on the increase.

Reverting to government administration, during the past two years we have also come to recognize the mistakes. This is why we started a medium-range government administration reform program, one that includes a streamlining of the local government model. We have accumulated experience during the past two years of governance. Although local governmental bodies are capable of functioning, there seems to be a need for improvement. The yardstick by which we must measure local autonomy is the extent to which local governments function well as part of, as representatives of state purposes, instead of being engaged in fruitless debates.

These changes also appear in the form of legal provisions, of course. We have submitted a legislative proposal regarding the police which is more responsive to present needs. We have also submitted a proposed government determination related to government administrative reform. Quite naturally, the ministry itself has also been seeking its place in the system of government administration. Thus, we developed a method of providing information to local government: We introduced regular information provision by organizing annual mayors' conferences.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] I am not fully convinced about government administration. Based on my experiences in the countryside I feel that local governments thoroughly deceive the ministry and the government itself with their sob stories. I recognize that aside from their whining, there is an awful lot of money in the hands of local governments, and that money does not expressly serve the appropriate interests of the public good. I am aware of some unrealistically high salaries and awards, while teachers complain about having to ration chalk. A view that holds that the country has become divided into two parts has evolved in the days of the party state. There is a leadership, and then there is the populace. The situation of the populace is far from being a proper reflection of the actual situation in which the country finds itself. Unfortunately, I also see this division at present, in the course of my travels to the countryside. What I see is a lack of high-level government administration at the lower levels; the lives of people do not reflect the actual situation of the country.

[Boross] I believe that you misunderstand the situation from the standpoint of deceiving the ministry. The ministry is fully aware of everything, ranging from disproportionate salaries all the way to the availability of cash. I myself have said more than once that pretended crying in parliament based on popularity had nothing to do with reality. The financial situation of local governments, except for a few, is substantially more favorable than the general situation in which the country finds itself. This is no secret. Similarly, it is no secret that beyond the disproportions you just mentioned, there also exist other discrepancies that are protected by autonomy and by standard budget subsidies. These are laws. Just what the future is going to bring? Last year and this year local governments have acquired huge fortunes. Some received huge fortunes, others acquired less. It

should be obvious that from the standpoint of financing based on the state budget, local government property, and return on such property must not be fully disregarded in the upcoming years, if for none other but the need to accomplish a relative uniformity in finances. This, however, requires a new law, because the present law does not enable us to accomplish this.

Interior Minister on Ministry's Security Mandate

*92CH0675C Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 25 May 92 p 4*

[Interview with Interior Minister Peter Boross by Tibor Paizs and Karoly Lencses; place and date not given: "Much Empty Political Talk Is Being Whipped Up, According to the Interior Minister"]

[Text] *Peter Boross granted an interview to UJ MAGYARORSZAG and MAGYAR HIRLAP. Tibor Paizs and Karoly Lencses interviewed the minister.*

[Paizs] The other day the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] charged that some uncontrollable peak organization was functioning within the Ministry of the Interior. What is your view?

[Boross] I hope that this is not what they said, but if they did, the opposition better point out specific instances in which I either violated laws or abused my authority, instead of making incomprehensible general statements and accusations. Some countries have separate police ministries and separate ministries for government administration. Our Interior Ministry is like the ones we find for example, in Sweden or in France, and it is exactly the same as what we had before the war in Hungary: It supervises both the police and government administration. This is not unusual; there is nothing new about it. Well, anyone experiencing heart troubles as a result of this arrangement has already a different kind of heart problem.

[Paizs] They referred to the interior minister wanting to expropriate the police for himself.

[Boross] Expropriate? Well, this would be rather difficult, since the police is an organ under the authority of the interior minister. Quite naturally, we included every authority exercised by interior ministers elsewhere in Europe into the legislative proposal concerning the police. Let parliament decide whether it agrees with that. Some opposition parties raised no objections to this arrangements in the course of preliminary negotiations; not so the SZDSZ, the organization which objects regularly, supposedly based on their being uninformed, a lack of management knowledge, or simply as a result of a political intent to regularly oppose everything.

[Lencses] Mr. Minister, in the West and in many other countries national security is subject to the interior ministers' supervision. Would it not be logical for us to return to this traditional model two years after the system change?

[Boross] This is exactly the issue. In Hungary, however, the government does not have an intent to combine the two functions, and a new minister is going to be appointed soon to head that ministry, as the head of government said. At that point, those who recognize something frightening in the present situation will be able to relax. Anyone who believes that under the present conditions a minister exercising supervisory authority also acquires limited powers, has never worked in an organization, and anyone unfamiliar with the rules of the way things function must have very little knowledge about administration. On the other hand, the one who is aware of all this and makes such statements does none other than whip up a lot of empty political talk. The exception is when one can prove that the interior minister has taken actions which can be countered by legal arguments.

[Paizs] The opposition also recommends that local governments be granted veto powers regarding the appointment of police chiefs.

[Boross] Yes, I am aware of the fact that at the Tuesday session of the National Assembly an SZDSZ representative is going to ask me to relieve of his duties the police chief of a certain city. I will state in response that I am unable to do so. The police can only function in the framework of a career system. A leading police official subject to election every four or five years will unavoidably adapt himself to those holding a veto power. I need not explain the dangers this kind of situation holds. I find it natural, of course, for the mayor to express his views prior to an appointment, but I do not find it appropriate to enable a mayor to prevent an appointment. If this were the case, the police chief would develop adverse inclinations, an inclination to accommodate, and this kind of situation is dangerous. Incidentally, I do not believe in total autonomy. Democracy is a system based on the separation of powers. Anyone who believes that autonomous local governments are entitled to unlimited authority, is not familiar with the operational rules of structures and is unable to think in the framework of a model.

[Lencses] Is it true that you are proposing changes in the Criminal Code of Laws to protect the economy?

[Boross] Yes, a proposal will be ready shortly, perhaps next week. In it, we recommend certain changes in Criminal Code provisions, which have not been changed along with the changing world. Fraud is one example. We want to make the gravest of actions subject to prosecution under criminal law.

[Lencses] Isn't the minister of justice aggrieved by this action?

[Boross] No, because he is aware of this intent of ours. What we are preparing is an outline subject to review by the Ministry of Justice. It was initiated by us because it is based on direct police experience, including some failed investigations. I wish to stress that all this amounts

to an initiative, it is not a legislative proposal. The minister of justice will submit the legislative proposal.

[Paizs] You mentioned fraud, but drug-smuggling is also subject to very weak sanctions in Hungary.

[Boross] Last December I have already submitted to the National Assembly a package plan concerning changes in the Criminal Code; it also includes proposed changes in several other respects. This has not been placed on the agenda due to more urgent matters. On the other hand, the issue of tax fraud has become an urgent matter also as a result of the budgetary situation.

The minister had this to say about the events at the Eastern Railroad Terminal, notably, the fact that the police removed a few people who had participated in the strike: "The one who sits on the rails and thus impedes traffic is not a striker, but a disorderly person who must be removed."

Exempting Court Officials From Civil Service

92CH0680A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 19 May 92 p 4

[Statement by Andras Hollo, Constitutional Court executive secretary: "Constitutional Statehood, Above All"]

[Text] *In our 15 April issue, Gyorgy Kiss, a member of the Constitutional Law Committee of the National Assembly, said that the Constitutional Court regarded the application of legal provisions applicable to public officeholders to its staff employees as contrary to law. Andras Hollo, the executive secretary of the Constitutional Court, states his views in this regard.*

"Debate over how to classify the Constitutional Court staff began when we learned about a legislative proposal concerning the legal status of public officials. In our view, the situation of the Constitutional Court is peculiar in this regard because the Court's independence must be guaranteed by all possible means. The situation of experts and advisers active at the Constitutional Court is special; they do not directly fit into a system centered around government administration, the system that governs the work of public employees and public officials. This does not apply to the administrative and management staff and to employees involved in finances and procurement, of course.

"In our view, labor relations provisions applicable to professionals whose work affects the substance of Constitutional Court decisions must be contained in the law governing the Constitutional Court, and this also means that this law is subject to adoption by a two-thirds

majority of the National Assembly, and that a 50-percent-plus-one-vote majority does not suffice. We have submitted our views in writing to the interior minister when the legislative proposal was being prepared. Once that has been finalized, we also conveyed our views to the president of the National Assembly. Accordingly, at issue is the fact that insofar as the above-mentioned employees are classified as part of the civil service, the previously established independence of the Constitutional Court suffers a wrong, in other words, the law could be challenged on the basis of the Constitution. This view also has its practical consequences, because the Constitutional Court has no two views regarding any given issue. My letter to the chairman of the Constitutional Law Committee had been based on an authorization granted at a session of the full Constitutional Court. This is no extortion or threat in my view; it merely amounts to an objective statement that must be taken into consideration in any circumspect legislative effort.

"Similarly, risking a situation in which the Constitutional Court would work without an appropriate legal background, could not be accepted either. We also thought of temporarily retaining in force certain paragraphs of the old Labor Law regarding our special situation. Since the Committee on Constitutional Law has disagreed with this view of ours, a supplemental recommendation prevailed, according to which we are governed by special provisions of the law, just as the National Assembly, the State Accounting Office, and the Office of the President of the Republic are. Thus, one may disregard otherwise mandatory past service period considerations when classifying positions. Since in our case we are dealing not with bureaucrats, but with scientific personnel, with professionals who deal in theories and have grades, such a change is urgently needed. In other words, in given instances, a 50-year-old former ministerial division chief would be classified the same way as a 35-year-old candidate. This solution would enable us to employ professionals of an appropriate quality. Irrespective of this, however, we also dispute in principle the real applicability of the civil service law to our organization. This, however, should not suggest that encouraged by the example set by us, any small organization should demand a separate law for itself, because no other organization in Hungary has a legal status similar to that of the Constitutional Court. If for none other, we have a separate law governing our organization and functioning—Law No. 32 of 1989—that could accommodate all standards characteristic of courts. All this is not a matter of some personal lobbying, but is, instead, a position based on constitutional considerations even if this legal provision impacts on individual interests. Just as any other law. But I find it far more important from the standpoint of constitutional statehood to consistently enforce the principle of separation of powers in the course of legal practice."

Businessmen See Lack of Dynamism in Market

92EP0481A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish
No 22, 30 May 92 p 3

[Article by Piotr Sarzynski: "Capitalists...Unite!"]

[Text] A couple of months ago on the "Careers and Barriers" television program, the candidacy of Zbigniew Niemczycki, the well-known businessman, was proposed—half-jokingly, half-seriously—for the post of prime minister. I do not know what Niemczycki thought about this idea, but as of now the private business circles seem to be keeping their distance from politics. Money and authority meet rarely in our country and without results.

Polish capitalists were like the times in which they operated. Up to the 1970's the owners of tailoring factories, greenhouses, automobile shops, and small paint and orangeade factories, located on the fringes of large cities, reigned. Then came the time for those who invested in chicken farming. Many of them went from that to really large businesses and are conducting them to this day. Those who came out of the poultry business include the following: Kazimierz Grabek, Roman Kwasny, and Kazimierz Pazgan (the latter received the Z. Szegluga prize). Next, the 1980's was the era of Polonia firms and the first large-scale sales offices of Western firms. That way of building large fortunes—in view of the weakness of our own production and trade—appears to be successful to this very day.

Finally, the end of the 1980's was a time of huge and quick fortunes amassed from trade, mainly international. Alcohol, cigarettes, electronics, foodstuffs, gasoline, currency exchange—those were the first sources of capital for such powers as Aleksander Gawronik (Poznan), Janusz Stajszczak ("Weltinex"—Bydgoszcz), Mariusz Switalski ("Elektromis"—Poznan).

An interesting fact is that among the leaders of Polish big business are many former race car drivers, to mention a few: Sobieslaw Zasada, Adam Smorawinski, Krzysztof Strykier, Blazej Krupa, and Marian Bien.

It is also characteristic that many of today's greats began abroad. Czeslaw Kopielnicki (HAD) [expansion unknown] began in Sweden "with two suitcases," and Krzysztof Rucinski (Venessa) "with English learned in school and a few hundred dollars" in the United States. Zbigniew Niemczycki also won his spurs in the United States, and Danuta Piontek won hers in Africa. Piotr Buchner, in opening a business in Poland already had a number of successes to his credit in Switzerland. Abroad they gained the knowledge, skills, contacts, and money with which to operate in Poland.

What does the situation look like today?

Capitalists Without Capital!

Everything indicates that of late, capitalism in Poland has lost its dynamism and even seems to be shrinking. It

is not profitable to produce, and trade has ceased to be the hen which lays large golden eggs. Private capital, instead of concentrating, is dispersing. More and more rarely do we hear about expansion, more and more often, however, we hear about businesses being closed or being moved abroad (starting with Czechoslovakia, all the way to Ireland). Very simply, our capitalists are beginning to experience a shortage of money, and this means the beginning of the end.

According to Andrzej Machalski, chairman of the Confederation of Polish Employers, we will soon hear about the spectacular downfall of a couple of giants. "El-Gaz" is a portent of this. What is interesting is that as a rule it is those who were believed to be the strongest who have gotten into trouble thus far. The reason: Due to their position, they easily and unstintingly received the bank credits which they are now unable to repay.

Businessmen tend to lay the blame for this on everyone around. They complain about the constantly changing regulations (mainly in regard to taxes), the musical chairs played by one economic governing team after another, and the inconsistency of economic policy. They bad-mouth the banks and the expensive credits. Krzysztof Rucinski, one of the founders of the Polish Capital Club, in an interview granted to ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, says: "The year 1989 was a year of hope for me and my friends. In 1990 I realized that things would not be normal, that again, as formerly, there is a monopoly on smartness, that some people are better and some are worse, that it is not work and ideas that are determining factors, but arrangements and little deals and one's military history."

The profusion of scandals evokes a great deal of bitterness. According to most of the people I talked with, it is rooted exclusively in the ups and downs of the political games played between various groupings. Meanwhile, the atmosphere is beginning to thicken and, in the social awareness, the private entrepreneur, the same as under Gomulka, is more and more frequently becoming a synonym for malefactor, and in the best case, a wheeler-dealer.

The head of the MARC-POL network of shops, Marek Mikuskiewicz, says bitterly in ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE: "We want to make changes in ownership and we are making a frontal attack of private business! Poland is starting to be associated with scandals. In other words, the risk of investing here is constantly growing. But the real reasons for the collapse of the economy, i.e., the low productivity of labor, are not being exposed."

But those who have been carefully observing the sector of large private ownership from the sidelines, believe that the other side is also not without fault.

They believe that our own capitalists have assessed the strength of the market, their money and skills, too optimistically. They choked on the easily earned billions and, quite chaotically, as a rule, began to invest them.

To increase their power, they applied for credits, believing that the profit rate would always be that high. They expanded their empires beyond the measure of need or demand. They built giant firms, which they cannot now manage. The newest generation of Polish businessmen is made up mostly of merchants who suddenly became wealthy, and not of industrialists. The winds of history blew and the draft wafted some of them to paradise. But not always the best, only those who were closest to the door.

The disintegration of the economy was a trump card for them, but now, when they began to invest, it became a barrier. They do not know how to make strategic and organizational decisions, have trouble in making an honest cost-effectiveness analysis and do not know how to lead large groups of people. They knew how to go to Rotterdam with a suitcase full of money to buy petroleum, but in a professional banking system they are lost. Of course, they are able to learn and draw conclusions. The question is will they get there in time, or will the mistakes that they made turn out to be decisive. Especially because they cannot count on any help (or even friendliness) from the government, banks, or society. Everyone is simply looking on to see who will bankrupt next.

KT [columnist Krzysztof Teodor Toeplitz] called the Polish businessmen "an adolescent mute" referring to the institutionalized forms in which they express their interests, strivings, and opinions. Capitalism in Poland is in the "toddler" stage and the degree to which the community is organized is the same.

Dreams of Leather Armchairs

The first attempt to create a capitalist lobby in our country was the memorable Economic Societies, formed in 1986, i.e., still under the former system. The initiators were Gabriel Janowski, Andrzej Machalski, and Aleksander Paszynski. For two years the authorities would not give permission to form the societies, but finally they agree to the creation of local organizations. But it must be added that the economic societies were more an intellectual phenomenon than a practical one. It seems that the historically great (and unquestionable) role of the Society is already behind them and its culmination point were the 1989 elections, when about 20 members were elected to the Sejm and the Senate.

In November 1989 the Confederation of Polish Employers [KPP] was formed. It was made up of the Union of Polish Handicraft Workers [ZRP], the Association of Employers in Poland, the All-Poland Association of Managers, the Directors' Union, and the Economic Societies. The formation of the Confederation aroused enormous interest in the mass media and it was underscored everywhere that employer-employee relations in our country are being Europeanized. But it seems that the Confederation did not achieve the role which its creators counted on. No system of negotiation

between both sides, so natural in the West, was developed, and its occasionally striking workers do not even think about talking to their management or its union, but immediately demand to see the minister. Today the Confederation—and this is really a paradox—has a much stronger position and more favorable climate abroad than in Poland.

At the same time, with the unions of employers (mainly state) formed seemingly from the top and in a planned way, another movement began—that of forming, from the bottom, associations that would primarily unite private businessmen. That is how the rather elitist Capital Clubs were formed. They were aimed at medium-sized business—the UFO Club, and the Business Centre Club [BCC], which wants to unite everyone. All of them, despite certain differences, have a few characteristics in common.

First of all, the tendency to combine a need for comradeship with business. The relatively young Polish business community is urgently seeking its own identity, building a separate ethos, attempting to create its own individual small world. It was with this need in mind to distinguish themselves that an entire accompanying mini-infrastructure arose: periodicals (COLLECTION, BUSINESSMEN, SUCCESS), auction houses, restaurants, balls, travel offices, and even credit cards and golf courses. The clubs, too, must have all of this. In KKP [Polish Capital Club], with businessmen in mind, an art gallery and an elegant restaurant was organized (entry by special cards). UFO is organizing closed balls and in the BCC brochures we read: "Will this be a place in which discreet talks about money and politics are conducted in deep leather armchairs, with a cigar in hand and a glass of whiskey? Yes! The Business Centre can also be that kind of place."

Naturally, all of these clubs, in their bylaws and program documents, stress that their professional goals are to unite: to establish business contacts abroad, to mutually support each other in conducting economic activities, in conducting common interests, in organizing data banks on the capabilities of the individual firms, etc. KKP is establishing companies to trade with other countries, is getting ready to open offices in Dubai and Santiago de Chile, is organizing a Polish Development Fund which will be a credit-guarantee insurer for the club's members. BCC is creating a huge data bank on its member firms, is establishing information centers in the United States, and is issuing special directories. Thus far, these clubs principally fulfill an integrational role and achieve their best results, I would say, in the area of mutual self-help and member support in individual, ongoing endeavors.

Unheard Lobby

Marek Goliszewski, BCC director, explains: "We have assembled in order to attempt to represent the interests of Polish enterprises to our society and to our parliament. This is a specific economic lobby, representing

and integrating people of business." I heard similar opinions in all employer organizations.

At the moment, the results are modest. True, BCC created a Special Advisory Commission which submits its proposals to the Council of Ministers, the Office of the Sejm, and the Office of the President. The Convention of Entrepreneurs obtained advisory status to the prime minister. Every once in a while the clubs' representatives meet with the individual ministers and heads of the central offices. On 14 February 1992, 250 businessmen, BCC members, met with the ministers of industry and ownership transformations and a group of deputies and senators. But I get the impression that there is more mutual courtesy and protocol in this than concrete results. Lobbies have been created which no one wants to listen to. I believe this is due to two reasons.

First, the conversations are only with the strong. Yet the scattered, thus far, and inwardly looking organizations of entrepreneurs cannot lead 100,000 people to the Sejm building. They cannot strike and they have no bargaining chips with which they could move the government. The need for unity resulted in the fact that in November 1991 a Polish Economic Council was formed, and an agreement in this matter was signed by the National Chamber of Commerce, the ZRP, and the KPP. It is "to speak out in behalf of the private sector."

It is interesting that the Convention of Entrepreneurs, Salesmen and Farm Producers, registered a month later, has set this same goal for itself. The following joined this convention: the Polish Capital Club, UFO, and the Business Center Club. In the "founders' manifesto" of the convention we read: "We must unite and develop a political force, creating our own prestigious institutions which will promote our positions on current and long-range matters." It appears that this is not all, because a concept of establishing a community "roundtable" conference is also developing. This conference would assemble once a month for exactly this same purpose: to formulate the position of the entire Polish business community in regard to the authorities.

Another reason for the weakness of the influence of the business community on how economic rule is exercised and the form of the laws, is the situation in the government. "No sooner do we establish some kind of understanding with the representatives of the government and it appears that they are beginning to understand our problems and treating our ideas seriously, then another political churning occurs and we have to start everything all over again," I heard in KKP. Businessmen generally complain that the persons occupying posts in the ministries are successively worse, professionally, and that all of them are so absorbed in the political struggle that it is hard to discuss any substantive matters with them. They believe that although they are treated with friendliness and their comments and memoranda are received with gratitude, none of this brings any results.

Elections Overview

The interest of the political parties in the business community grows regularly before elections. Joint meetings are arranged, declarations and promises are made, assurances are given that the just interests of the business community will be taken into consideration, and deep concern is expressed about the development of the private sector in Poland. The wave of interest suddenly drops after the elections when campaign money is no longer needed. For most politicians and groupings, businessmen are still a seasonal partner, treated according to the existing state of affairs, mainly as a supplier of money for one purpose or another.

According to popular opinion, the party which has the greatest influence in the entrepreneurial circles is the Liberal-Democratic Congress. My interviews do not confirm this opinion, because we frequently forget that "who is with whom" does not necessarily decide programs, but also—and in Poland, usually—mutual personal contacts, arrangements between friends. And among the Polish business elite, it appears that the VIP's in the Democratic Union and Center Accord, have the most. Anyway, we must admit that both these groupings are the ones who are most consistently wooing our capitalists.

The businessmen themselves are not very keen about creating their own political representation (although the dormant "Economic Party" was formed), while notions of "riding the coattails" of a single party, due to the diverse number of political views in the business community, are doomed to failure. But this does not mean that Polish capitalists avoid politicians, only that the mutual contacts are almost entirely in the nature of private connections. Obviously, the higher the standing of the businessman, the more influential are his friends. And admittedly, despite the rather frequent rotations on the Polish political scene, the Polish financial elite stays close.

Equal Distance Theory

For people who conduct important business in Poland and invest large amounts of capital, building a network of friendships with politicians and decisionmakers is a way of creating a "protective umbrella" as well as access to important information. This is a very natural impulse even among those who do business with the highest integrity. With the political musical chairs being played today, the most popular theory among businessmen is the "equal distance" one: Maintain correct relations with all groupings and parties. Sometimes this has amusing results. I know entrepreneurs who supported the elections campaigns of competing candidates. "Just in case," they said. And it wasn't at all a matter of gaining influence or privileges, or of some kind of contest. It was a "peace gesture." Anyway, we must admit that politicians do not avoid such connections. No

one knows when someone will stumble, and then it will be easier to get a cushy job as consultant or director in a company.

It is primarily the representatives of the decadent socialist establishment who are revealing their new face as businessmen. A few of them even made the list of the wealthiest Poles. It seems that their communist experience was useful in managing their own firms. Obviously, most of this talk is about Jerzy Urban, but the former deputy prime minister, Ireneusz Sekula, is doing beautifully in his new role.

In writing about the connection of business with politics, the existence of the Polish Economic Program (PPG), known popularly as the "Large beer," cannot be ignored. Although in the elections campaign it appealed to the private entrepreneurs circles, its program was publicly supported by well-known businessmen, and a few of them (Andrzej Czernecki, Jan Zylber, and Tomasz Bankowski) were on the elections lists. Still, it obtained a surprisingly large number of votes—mostly, it would appear, contesting the politics of the youth. And thus, as a result of political gamesmanship, PPG quite unexpectedly found itself in the "coalition of three" negotiating with the government, and the name of its leader was constantly mentioned along with Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Donald Tusk.

The head of the PPG parliamentary club, Tomasz Bankowski, is aware of the fact that his grouping has limited social legitimacy. But he believes that the existence of the private business community in the political scene of the Sejm is a very normal thing: "In highly developed countries which have a 200-year tradition of parliament and democracy and a developed and stable economy, the interests of the large-capital circles can be protected to a sufficient degree by various types of nonparliamentary lobbies. In Poland we do not have strong organizations of this type, and that is why I believe the existence of PPG is very useful. Especially because the Solidary trade unions have their representatives in parliament."

Is it possible, therefore, that PPG can become an actual political representative of the Polish business interests? Theoretically, yes. They declare their willingness and have experienced entrepreneurs-practitioners in their ranks. But it seems that the party is acting on its own, that it lacks deep and steady contacts with the employer organizations. There is insufficient communication between the community and those who wish to and can be their representative.

Can Polish capitalists exist as an integrated, influential political and economic force? According to Danuta Piotek, the person who thus far has done the most to unite the people of business, every successive attempt, every successive agreement, even if immediately not very effective, can bring this moment closer. She believes that the creation of such a force is no longer even a matter of aspiration or prestige, but a matter of the protection of

the basic interests of both this social group and the entire economy. It is a great misconception that we look enviously at the United States and England, while at the same time we are constantly subjecting to public opinion the growing strata of people who are building a private economy in Poland and ruining them with taxes.

Lech Walesa once promoted a vision of politics supported firmly on two legs. In employer-employee relations, only one leg exists: the workers self-managements and the trade unions. Apparently we are witnessing the placing of scaffolding under the second leg.

[Box, p 3]

In Poland, over 1.4 million factories owned by physical persons are registered. Of these, scarcely 50,000 employ over five people. There are approximately 3,500 private enterprises which could be called large (employing over 20 workers, and in construction, over 50). During the year the number of joint ventures almost tripled, while the number of private companies increased 40 percent. Last year the share of private and foreign enterprises in the state's receipts amounted to approximately 9 percent. This indicator was highest in construction—over 20 percent—and, in trade, almost 17 percent.]

[Box, p 3]

To What Do Businessmen Belong?

I. Polish Capital Club (KKP)

This is an association formed in December 1990, with headquarters in Warsaw. It has 40 members belonging to the first ranks of Polish business (eight of them are on the list of the 50 wealthiest Poles published by the weekly WPROST). It is not easy to become a member. The candidates must have the recommendation of three charter members, and, upon approval by the board, pay a 50-million zloty [Z] initiation fee. Monthly dues are another Z3 million. Only a businessman who can show an annual profit of at least a million dollars can become a member. KKP members are also acting independently but under identical rules: Lodz Capital Club (20 members) and Silesian Capital Club. According to estimates, KKP members own approximately 15 percent of the private capital in Poland. They are owners or controlling-interest stockholders of five private banks.

II. Confederation of Polish Employers (KPP)

Formed in November 1989. Its members are not direct physical persons, but regional or branch associations of employers (a total of 22). The confederation encompasses approximately 500 employers—owners or heads of enterprises employing a total of almost 90,000 people. KKP's members are primarily state employers (approximately 80 percent of the membership).

III. Business Center Club (BCC)

This is part of a larger consortium, "Business Foundation," which publishes the Business Foundation Book.

Both enterprises and firms (600, most of them private), as well as individual businessmen (1,000 persons), belong. It has a network of 100 agents throughout Poland. The initiation fee is Z35 or Z50 million (the amount paid determines the range of privileges obtained). It concentrates on promoting its members abroad and seeking contracting parties for collaboration. The ambition of BCC is to create a strong economic lobby to protect the interests of entrepreneurs. Each year the club awards a "Leader of Polish Business" statuette.

IV. UFO Business Club

It began in 1990 and has its offices in the Warsaw suburb of Anin. It has a hundred-plus members—representatives of firms or individual businessmen. The initiation fee is Z1 million and two members must vouch for a candidate-member. UFO gives prizes each year for

the best businessmen of the year. A Polish Business Association company was formed in the club, which is charged with organizing joint economic ventures for UFO members.

V. Convention of Entrepreneurs, Salesmen, and Farm Producers

The youngest of all, registered in December 1991 on the strength of the law on employer organizations. UFO, KKP, and BCC have joined the Convention, plus many unaffiliated entrepreneurs. They declare themselves to be apolitical. In their assumptions they state that they are to become a force uniting all employer associations and organizations in Poland in order to represent their interests to the government, parliament and foreign institutions. The Convention has already obtained advisory status to the prime minister.

Biography of CD Presidential Candidate

92P20335A Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian
30 Jun 92 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article on the candidate of the Democratic Convention, CD, for president of Romania: "Biographic Notes on Emil Constantinescu"]

[Text]

- Born on 19 November 1939, in Tighina, into the family of an agronomical engineer originally from the former Regat. Spent his childhood in Bradet, Arges County.
- Secondary school studies in Pitesti, Balcescu (Branianu) secondary school, graduated in 1956.
- University studies: Bucharest Law School, graduated in 1960. Bucharest Faculty of Geology and Geography, graduated in 1966.
- Scientific titles: doctor of geology, Bucharest 1979.
- Recipient of the Cobalcescu award of the Romanian Academy, 1980.
- Married in 1963 to Nadia Constantinescu, lawyer, counselor in the Ministry of Justice; two children who are students, a son (24 years old) and a daughter (21 years old).
- Personal property: a 1979 car; they live in a state-owned apartment in the Pajura area.

Professional Activity

- 1960-62: Legal consultant at the Pitesti Arbitration Office.
- 1966-79: Assistant in the Department of Minerology, geological engineering section, Bucharest University.
- 1979-90: Lecturer in the same department.
- 1990: Lecturer.
- 1990: Elected prorector of Bucharest University.
- 1990: Elected general secretary of the Romanian Society for Geological Sciences. Member of geological societies in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany.
- 1991: Professor, Department of Minerology, Faculty of Geology, Bucharest University.
- 1992: Elected rector of Bucharest University and chairman of the National Conference of Rectors.
- 1990-92: Courses and lectures at universities in the United States (Duke, Stanford, Berkeley, Indiana), Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria.
- Specialized publications: seven volumes and more than 60 studies published in Romania and in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain.

—Position on the Romanian Communist Party [PCR] and the Securitate: Member of the PCR from 1965 to 1989, a deputy for propaganda for a time, and in 1989, a deputy for job-related issues in the party organization of the Faculty of Geology. During all these years, he published absolutely nothing to support communist ideology and policy. On no occasion did he take a position which was detrimental to any colleague or student. On the night of 22-23 December 1989, he initiated, together with a few colleagues and students, the dissolution of the PCR organization in the faculty. He did not have any kind of connections with the Securitate.

Political Activity

- Participated in actions in support of democracy beginning with the big demonstrations in the winter of 1989-90. In April 1990, he assumed responsibility for opening the balcony on University Square and for organizing subsequent demonstrations.
- Took an explicit public position toward the political events of the past two years by means of interviews with BBC, Deutsche Welle, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and France International, as well as articles published in the country and abroad (Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States).
- Is a founding member of University Solidarity, the Memoria Foundation, and the Civic Alliance. Currently, he is vice chairman of the Civic Alliance. In this capacity, he has initiated many foreign policy contacts with various parties: in Germany, the Christian Democratic Party; in France, the Social Christian Party (Bernard Stasi), the Republican Party (Francois Leotard); in the Netherlands, the Liberal Party; in the United States, the Republican Party (David Funderburk), as well as with government bodies. As a result of these contacts, the Romanian-German Conference met in Bucharest in 1991 and in Munich in 1992 and leaders of these parties such as D. Schmidt, F. Scheurle, F. Leotard, B. Stasi, and D. Funderburk, visited Romania.
- Established contacts with Romanian emigre representatives and with representatives of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Germany, France, the United States, Great Britain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands and set up support groups for University Solidarity and the Civic Alliance.
- Is president of the Civic Academy, in the framework of which he has coordinated a number of programs for free medical assistance for the very poor, for free legal advice for persons suffering injury from the present government, and labor legislation courses for trade union leaders.
- As chairman of the Antitotalitarian Front (on rotation, as a representative of the Civic Alliance), he participated in setting up the Democratic Convention in November 1991.

New Foreign Minister on Diplomatic Objectives

AU0707101992 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 92 p 3

[Report by D. Ujevic: "Three Phases of Croatian Diplomacy"]

[Text] Zagreb—The main objectives of the Croatian diplomatic service are integration into Europe, cooperation with the world, the utilization of all international possibilities for the reconstruction of the country, close cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina, cooperation with the UNPROFOR [UN Protective Forces], the coordination of the diplomatic and consular network, the protection of the interests of Croats outside Croatia, the affirmation of Croatia on the international scene, and the coordination of foreign policies.

Dr. Zdenko Skrabalo, minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia, stated these priorities at his debut news conference yesterday. The conference was also attended by his deputy, Prof. Miomir Zuzul, and Ante Babic, the cabinet chief.

The ministry is to be reorganized by 1 September in order to accomplish such a demanding task. That would include a significant increase in the ministry's staff (it now employs 135 people, 105 of whom are in Zagreb, and 30 in diplomatic and consular missions), and the replacement of four out of five deputy ministers. That did not indicate dismissal, but departure for other duties, Dr. Skrabalo stressed. As for public speculation on the staff structure of the ministry of foreign affairs, he said the following:

"Out of the 135 people employed in the ministry, 22.2 percent were inherited from the Yugoslav diplomatic service, and 77.8 were selected by Croatia. The 'old' ones have adjusted extremely well, since in choosing them the most important criteria were that they were experts and morally untainted. Still, in joining the Croatian diplomatic service, they had to accept the principle that they could not do service in a country in which they used to be Yugoslav diplomats."

The ministry had introduced another principle, a "preventive" one—the diplomatic service would not accept people from the evacuated parts of Croatia, where, according to the new minister, there were many factions and currents, but which did not mean that there were no honorable exceptions. As for the new staff, the highest world criteria would apply: expertise, experience, patriotism, youth, and prospects (10 people who are now being educated in Switzerland are between the ages of 20 and 41). Also, they would have to pass an international intelligence test, test of general education, fine manners, and resourcefulness. And the final condition would be perfect fluency in one world language, and understanding of one or two more.

Dr. Skrabalo spoke of the three phases of Croatian diplomacy. The first one was the illegal, "heroic" one,

when some people, even before the war, promoted the Croatian idea in the world. The result of that was that, when war broke out, all international humanitarian organizations immediately arrived in Croatia. The second phase was the period when the world began to recognize Croatia, and the third phase was now, when Croatian diplomacy had to be adjusted according to international criteria. Such diplomacy, Dr. Skrabalo said, was the fourth angle in the quadrangle, which was also made up of defense, information, and economy.

Answering the journalists questions, Dr. Skrabalo said that Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had not formed any kind of military alliance, and that certain misunderstandings between Croatia and Slovenia were of a technical nature, not fundamental.

Asked whether there would be a revision of the agreement with the UN on the deployment of peacekeeping troops in Croatia now that it had become an internationally recognized country, the new foreign minister said that talks were under way, and that the UNPROFOR operations were an international process and was developing well thanks to the support from the international community. As for possible practical implications of the Istanbul meeting, he said that he would have to wait for the Croatian delegation's report. Dr. Skrabalo concluded that the Islamic world had started to stir over Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it was a different matter altogether whether that would have any practical consequences other than humanitarian ones.

[Box, p 3]

Doctors in Politics

"I have never belonged to any party. I have always been strictly a professional man. My priority is Croatia, then a democratic, then a Christian democratic, and then a European Croatia. It is not true that I do not like to meet journalists. It is only that I believe that journalists should be approached only when there is something to tell them." With these words Dr. Skrabalo presented himself to the journalists yesterday, introducing a personal touch into the conference.

Why are there so many doctors in politics these days? Dr. Skrabalo believes that this is so because doctors are people who have to make quick decisions at critical moments, and they listen to themselves, rather than someone above.

Croatia Ahead of America

The medical war team had tested the abilities of our war medical service at the outbreak of the war on a simulated 5,000 dead and 20,000 wounded. Unfortunately, this sample became a reality. How the Croatian medical service functioned in the war is shown by some comparative data, which has fascinated even world experts. In the Vietnam war, the Americans had 4.1 to 4.9 percent dead among those wounded on the first front line. In the Gulf war, they managed to reduce that percentage to 2.3

to 2.7 percent dead. In the Croatian war, Dr. Skrabalo said, 1.3 to 1.9 percent died of those wounded on the front line.

Liberals Propose Budisa as Presidential Candidate

*AU0807180192 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jul 92 p 4*

[Report by Z. Duka: "Choice According to Ability and Honesty"]

[Text] Zagreb—Several days ago the Grand Council of the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLs] nominated its president Drazen Budisa as candidate for president of Croatia. At yesterday's news conference, Dr. Franjo Zenko read a short biography of their candidate Budisa.

Drazen Budisa was born in 1948 in Drnis. He graduated from high school in Split, and in 1967 he started studies of philosophy and sociology at the Faculty of Humanistic Studies. As the leader of the student movement of 1971, he was arrested in December the same year and served a four-year sentence. He graduated after coming out of prison in 1976, and the following year he was employed at the National and University Library, where he worked as treasurer for several years.

He played a prominent role in the formation of the Croatian party opposition in 1989, and since 1990 he has been president of the HSLs, the first opposition party in Croatia. In August 1991 he was appointed member of the Croatian Government, but at the beginning of February this year he walked out because of his disagreement with a series of political moves of the Croatian leadership. He is married and has three sons.

It is interesting to note that yesterday Drazen Budisa, the first declared presidential candidate, presented to the public the list of his property, income, tax duties, credits, and debts, and he did the same for members of his family.

Budisa then read names of 60 candidates from the state list of the HSLs, explaining that they had all been chosen according to ability and the fact that they were honest and uncompromised, and he pointed out that all Croatian regions were represented by those candidates. For obvious reasons, the names of candidates for election units were not read yesterday, as they were to be elected according to the system of relative majority. Budisa said that the HSLs would discuss these candidates with other parties of similar political inclinations, since the HSLs would probably not propose alone all 60 candidates. Budisa only revealed that Gen. Karlo Gorinsek would be their candidate for the election unit Valpovo-Beli Manastir.

Bozo Kovacevic, general secretary of the party, delivered several sharp objections yesterday to the manipulations of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and the monopolistic attitude it had towards the Croatian Television. In his words, the Croatian Television reporters

from the Istra region were explicitly forbidden to report anything at all about the recent tour that Budisa and the HSLs made in Istra. There were no reports from the debate in Pozega, as was the case with Daruvar. Although in Daruvar the HSLs had reserved a hall seven days before the meeting, the HDZ suddenly appeared in it by the decision of the government's department for that city, while the liberals were given a small hall in the suburbs. Kovacevic also said that for two days there were no forms for gathering signatures for presidential candidates to be found in the book shops, while lists for 10,000 signatures for a certain candidate (he did not name him) had "disappeared" on the way from the printers to the book shops. Apart from that, until yesterday the republican committee had still not had the addresses of its subcommittees in regions and cities. Kovacevic said that those were all dangerous indications which already brought the regularity of the elections under question.

The party's lawyer Danilo Gregovic said that, two days ago, the Croatian Constitutional Court had responded very laconically to the objections made by the HSLs as to the regularity of the elections in view of the fact that the population of Konavli and Cavtat would not be able to vote.

Answering reporters' questions, Budisa said that the decision by the UN Security Council that the Croatian Army should withdraw from the "pink" zones was absurd, because the stationing of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] had not even been planned for that area, and besides, before this war only Croats had lived in the seven villages of Miljevo. The taking of Miljevo was only the reaction of the Croatian Army to attacks by the opposite side. Budisa said that if it were up to him, he would not pull the army out of these zones, because he did not have complete trust in the UNPROFOR mission. Asked about the possible support of the Croatian Party of Rights for his candidacy, Budisa said that even if he did accept the support of some other party that would still not affect the HSLs policies of the center course. If he were elected, he said, he would respect all international agreements signed by Croatia, but he thought that, with the recognition of Croatia, the conditions of the Geneva agreement had significantly changed.

Osijek Mayor on City's Mafia-Type Crimes

*92BA1132D Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 p 3*

[Article by Mirko Sajler: "Kramaric About To Resign?"]

[Text] Osijek—The most recent crime, which occurred in Osijek in true Chicago style, was an occasion for Dr. Zlatko Kramaric, the city's mayor, to make a statement to newsmen.

"Unless the police prevent crimes, which are becoming more frequent in Osijek, as a sign of protest I will submit my resignation from the position of the city's first citizen. I simply do not want to be mayor of a city in

which people are not safe. The accelerating crime rate was brought to us by the war, but as a law-governed state we must prevent this."

The death of Robert Hoic (age 21), which has been very much talked about in Osijek, brought the mayor of Osijek to make that move. The young man became a victim when he got into his car and turned the key in the ignition. The bomb, planted Mafia-style, was activated by the ignition mechanism. The unfortunate Hoic and his car were blown up.

In the police department, however, they say they are doing everything they can. All that is happening in Osijek is not exclusively a police matter, but also a political matter. Certain responsible people in certain institutions of the system have with their statements been encouraging nighttime bombers who are blowing up other people's houses, stores, and cafes, and now they have centered on the citizens themselves.

"Even though on several occasions I called for the vigorous intervention of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the military police, nothing has changed in the city. I have been left alone in the fight against crime and the frequent cases of dirty work. It is incredible that there should be people who even do not condemn such acts, when they ought to be combating them," Dr. Kramaric has emphasized on several occasions.

What actually is happening in Osijek? It is an open secret that individuals steeped in crime infiltrated the ranks of the Croatian Army. For them, the uniform of a Croatian soldier is not an honor and an obligation, but a screen behind which they can commit their crimes more easily. Because in a patriotic war every soldier was welcome, because the Serbo-Chetnik army threatened to capture still more territory of Croatia in order to create an expanded Serbia, all volunteers were enrolled in the Croatian Army without definite criteria. Many thus obtained weapons that they carried legally. They have not been used against Croatia's enemies. They have been used to parade through the city, and frequently used to settle accounts within the Osijek underground. A great evil, which is now difficult to eradicate, has hovered over the city. If a large number of Croatian soldiers is demobilized, many will retain weapons that they have concealed and will continue their crimes. The military police has so far not done much to bring about order in the Croatian Army. For that matter, that police was itself created in the same way as the army. The members of the MUP had their rights taken away in this war. When they intervened, there was a conflict between the police and the soldiers in which the policemen inevitably got the worst of it. That is why the work of the Osijek police has been reduced to traffic control.

Some things are changing now. The police have begun to perform the role accorded them under the Constitution and Croatian law. In one of the recent actions, just about at the time when Robert Hoic's automobile blew up,

Drazen Kustro (age 30) was killed in a fight with representatives of the MUP in another part of the city, in the settlement known as "Sjenjak." A police patrol came by when he was removing the windshield from a parked automobile. From what we have been able to learn, Kustro was one of the officers of the 106th Brigade of the Croatian Army. A determination will be made later as to whether the policemen exceeded their authority. But it is certain that their every action in a city that is overflowing with crime also represents a danger to their own lives.

The evil can be eradicated only by the vigorous action of all the institutions of the system on which the institution of a law-governed state is based. Only in this way will the Mafia be prevented from burglarizing people's apartments, stealing the property of citizens of Osijek, black-mailing the owners of craft and trade establishments and restaurants, blowing up the property of others, and killing people. A year after the enemy bombardment, the people of Osijek deserve a more peaceful life in sovereign and independent Croatia.

Stipe Mesic Discusses History of HDZ

92BA1141C Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by Stipe Mesic, former Yugoslav president and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Croatian Democratic Community: "Voice of Authority: Stipe Mesic: Short History of the Croatian Democratic Community"]

[Text] The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] is a popular movement that emerged from the need for democratic renewal of national, sociopolitical, and economic life on the basis of all the positive values of Croatian political thought, from Starcevic's historic Croatian right to statehood to Radic's universal democratic republicanism to the beneficial experiences of the so-called Croatian Left.

In its basic program, the movement was open to different world views and ideological-political and religious convictions. Breadth, tolerance, but also a refusal to compromise in achieving the right of the Croatian people to self-determination and freedom were the most distinct features of the HDZ as a movement. Later, the HDZ became increasingly prominent as a party, in accordance with political circumstances and events.

The first public appearance by representatives of the HDZ was recorded on 28 February 1989 at the offices of the Society of Croatian Writers, where the Preliminary Draft of the Basic Program was presented at the speaker's platform there. The announced inaugural conference for the party had to be put off several times, because the then-communist government, acting through its police organs, blocked every proposed opportunity for the conference to be held in a public place. Finally, the inaugural conference was held in a "nonpublic place" on 17 June 1989, on the premises of the "Borac" soccer

club in Staglisce, and that date remains the initial moment in the history of the HDZ as a party.

There were 48 founders and three guests present at the inaugural conference. The rules of order under which the conference would function were adopted, and a Working Presidency was elected, comprising Dr. Franjo Tudjman (presiding officer), Dr. Daljbor Brozovic, Dr. Kresimir Balenovic, Dipl. Jur. Vladimir Seks, Dipl. Jur. Josip Manolic, and writer Milivoj Slavicsek.

Considering the possibility of police intervention and the potentially forcible interruption in the work of the conference, those present adopted a resolution whereby, if such a thing should happen, the conference would be regarded as having been held, i.e., constituted, and in that regard they accepted the HDZ Program Declaration, the HDZ Bylaws, and all the proposed HDZ bodies—as prepared for in the material submitted to the conference.

The conference was held and concluded with a closing word by President Dr. Franjo Tudjman. The reverberations from that conference in the official public at that time were tumultuous, but its reverberations among the Croatian people were even more tumultuous. It was obvious that a party had been created that captured the spirit of the Croatian populace and all of its classes.

The next compelling event in the history of the HDZ was the First General Congress of the HDZ, held on 24 and 25 February 1990. At that congress, which was attended by Croats from all over Croatia, Herceg-Bosnia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Boka, neighboring Hungary, Austria, Italy, European countries, and overseas, the Croatian national anthem was sung with tears in people's eyes, and the unfurling of the Croatian flag provoked a lengthy ovation. The "Documents of the First General Congress of the HDZ" were adopted at the congress, of which we emphasize the one about the admission of exiles into the HDZ, about the demographic situation in Croatia, about

a monument to everyone who throughout history has given his life on the altar of the homeland in the struggle for its freedom and independence, about the need to establish a Croatian news agency in Zagreb, about the Croatian national anthem, etc. Ample debate on reports and initiatives concluded with the acceptance of the HDZ Bylaws, the dissolution of existing HDZ bodies, and the election of new ones. By unanimous vote and amid enthusiastic chanting, Dr. Franjo Tudjman was elected HDZ chairman, the same man who declared courageously and with prophetic certainty: "Today we are here, but before long we will be in that other congress, the Assembly building on St. Mark's Square!"

And indeed, the first free, multiparty elections in Croatia since the Second World War showed how well Dr. Tudjman had appraised the feelings, inclinations, and strength of the Croatian people—the Croatian Democratic Community triumphantly achieved an electoral victory, attracting an enormous number of voters with its platform.

The road to the Assembly was open. The road to Croatian freedom was open. From that moment to today, the HDZ, operating under incredibly difficult international and internal wartime circumstances, has managed to achieve the most important points in its platform. Croatian guns are on Croatian shoulders, Croatian wallets are in Croatian pockets, and the Republic of Croatia is an internationally recognized, self-supporting, independent, and sovereign state.

Today, the HDZ is increasingly developing away from a movement and towards a modern European party with a Christian democratic orientation. The HDZ is going into the announced elections with major results, with the achievement of the dream of all Croats for their own state, with victory in the perfidious and imposed war that has threatened the very survival of the Croatian nation, and with the confidence of the people, which was not betrayed even under the most serious temptations. Nor will it be betrayed in the future.

Serbian Orthodox Church Violates Sanctions

92BA1125B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 17 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Joze Pojbic: "Strange Humanitarian Assistance"]

[Text] Lendava, 16 Jun—The border authorities at the international border crossing with Hungary in Dolga Vas, around 1030, inspected a column of five trucks with humanitarian assistance that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Ljubljana had collected primarily for the Serbian town of Bijeljina in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Just a slightly more detailed inspection of one of the trucks showed that the freight was not solely humanitarian in

nature, since among the food, clothing, and medicines the police also discovered well-hidden portable radio stations. They thus found 10 ICOM stations, four portable YAESU stations, and one stationary radio station, which can also be installed in an automobile. They consequently kept the column at the crossing for a long time and questioned its leader and the one who had organized collection of the assistance, Peran Boskovic, a priest from the Serbian Orthodox Church in Ljubljana. The equipment found was confiscated, of course, and the employees of the Sobota UNZ will file a complaint against those responsible. The trucks will be able to continue on their way with the real humanitarian assistance.

Effect of Economic Sanctions on Montenegro92BA1141B Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian
21 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Branislav Radunovic: "Crisis, War, and Blockade"]

[Text] *Our bitter understanding of the consequences of the arrogant domination of the economy by politics could have been avoided if enterprises and other economic subjects, as well as their associations, had been in a position to successfully oppose it.*

The maneuvering room for the economy of the FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia to somewhat mitigate the sanctions by the World Organization has been narrowed primarily because the four republics of the former Yugoslavia have endorsed the measures contained in the resolution by the Security Council, so that there is now a total interruption in the flow of goods and money. It is true that there were already quite a few disruptions in this flow because of the war, but it was not actually suspended. The interruption of the interrepublic flow of goods is, unfortunately, a logical consequence of the war, as is the rapid impoverishment of the population in all the areas of the former Yugoslavia due to the enormous resources that will be consumed for the war.

This war, however, has been unable to break off all the economic relations and business ties between enterprises, due to the high level of interdependence of their economies. Seven decades of functioning economically within Yugoslav borders has resulted in an increasing level of interdependence of economic processes in all its parts, which was, of course, caused both by the planned nature of economic development (from the very outset, this was based on the inherent assumption that individual areas would play different roles in overall development) and by the structural transformation imposed by the diversification of the economy and the increasingly strong connection between individual republics and provinces.

Interdependence

Perhaps the best example of this interdependence and reciprocal instruction in the ways of business is Zastava in Kragujevac, where thousands of contractors from all over the former Yugoslavia were involved in its product: the automobile. Being left today without a market of that sort, which for many years was synchronized for regular and planned cooperation, is the greatest loss that business partners in the chain of production can experience, especially the final producer, the finisher. In this context, it is assessed that our bitter understanding of the consequences of the arrogant domination of the economy by politics could have been avoided if enterprises and other economic subjects, as well as their associations, had been in a position to successfully oppose it. Fortunately, this has not happened entirely, because the people in many

enterprises were deeply aware that severing such interdependent business ties of many years' standing means mutual collapse.

It must be recognized that all this would not be happening like it is if the economy operated on the basis of market principles and if the company property had a concrete owner who made business decisions autonomously and whose existence depended exclusively on profits and earnings, and not politics. Such a situation presented major problems for all the collectives in Montenegro in terms of business communication and impeded business transactions, especially in terms of acquiring goods, semifinished products, and spare parts through the large number of intermediaries and lengthy detours, which made production many times more expensive.

A large number of Montenegrin enterprises had already severed cooperation with Croatia and Slovenia entirely, while all transactions in the flow of goods and money with Macedonia have long been conducted through a sort of barter system. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina necessitated the interruption of all cooperation with that republic as well. This blocked the repayment of a significant level of outstanding debts, so that the negative balance in debtor-creditor relations with that republic exceeds 2.5 billion dinars, which is an extremely high amount that will be difficult to settle, even assuming that the situation calms down and the conflict comes to a halt.

Prior to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin economy was a more important partner to the Serbian economy in terms of deliveries than with regard to acquisitions. Of total Montenegrin deliveries, 14.5 percent were destined for the Serbian market, while the share of acquisitions from that republic was significantly greater, at 28.3 percent. As far as Slovenia and Croatia are concerned, they accounted for 14 percent of total Montenegrin acquisitions, while in deliveries there was a considerable lag of 4.5 percent. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia effected a somewhat greater share of acquisitions compared to deliveries, 3.8 percent. Only with Kosovo were deliveries by the Montenegrin economy greater than acquisitions. Moreover, in the total negative balance of the Montenegrin economy, 42 percent relates to trade with Serbia, 28 to cooperation with Croatia, and 15 to Slovenia. Since 1 January of this year, the flow of goods and money has experienced a completely different trend—over 90 percent of these transactions by Montenegro are directed toward Serbia.

Sanctions

Because of this chaotic situation in the flow of goods and money with republics outside the FR Yugoslavia, the Economic Chamber of Montenegro recently directed an appeal to the chambers of those republics, asking that they exert influence on their governments in order to calm down the situation in the country and put an end to the military conflict, and also asking all enterprises to

maintain the previously established business ties and cooperation for the sake of undisturbed work and production under the new conditions. Something similar was also done by the economists who gathered at the recent conference in Becici. They pointed out that it is essential that economic cooperation be reestablished with the entire economic region of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of the fact that some former republics have become independent and separate states. Naturally, this fact is not insignificant, and cooperation between such republics objectively can no longer be like it was within the framework of a single state, but for that reason it is possible to set up an economic region in a new way, which must result from political agreements between republic-states within the context of a final resolution of the state and political crisis in Yugoslavia. The economists are convinced that this will bring with it the general conditions for a reanimation of interrepublic economic cooperation, with the reservation that it will certainly not be on the previous scale. If it is any consolation, it must be added here that support for such evidence on the need to renew interrepublic economic cooperation is also arriving from representatives of many countries who, within the framework of the work by the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, are proposing solutions for unraveling the state and political crisis. Perhaps this outside message on the further usefulness of our internal economic cooperation will be decisive, regardless of the fact that we ourselves have been unambiguously convinced of this many times over the past decades.

Proposal To Found Montenegro Council for Peace
92BA1132F Podgorica POBJEDA in Serbo-Croatian
20 Jun 92 p 4

[Proposal for formation of a council of the Republic of Montenegro for civil peace and ethnic equality: "A Disinterested Institution"]

[Text] The Council for Civil Peace and Ethnic Equality would be a special institution in the legal system of Montenegro, outside the system of the legislative, judicial, and executive branches, but at the same time an institution above political parties. Its place in the state, its basic functions, and its makeup would be determined by a statute, but the Council would regulate the manner of its operation independently, in its own operating procedure.

The Council would be an independent and disinterested institution with the highest moral authority in the republic.

The Council would not be accountable for its work and activity to any body or organization. It would be subject only to the judgment of the public.

The Council would be made up of the following:

- The president of the Republic, who would direct the Council.

- One representative from each of the parliamentary parties.
- One representative from the religious communities in Montenegro.
- The president of the Constitutional Court of Montenegro.

The legal basis for the work of the Council would be the federal and republic constitutions, the appropriate federal and republic laws, and international documents on human rights and freedoms.

The Council would take up current and long-term issues of importance to exercising the rights and freedoms of citizens, to achievement of ethnic equality, and to preservation of civil peace.

In addition to the issues which it would take up in accordance with its work program, the Council would have the task of examining initiatives, proposals, and opinions of individuals, bodies, and organizations of importance to civil peace and ethnic equality.

The Council would also have the right in the domain of human rights and freedoms to propose adoption of laws, declarations, and other enactments.

The Council would adopt declarations, assessments, positions, proposals, recommendations, and responses on matters within its competence, and it would present them to the competent bodies and interested entities, and if necessary to international organizations as well. The Council would decide which of its acts would be made public by the news media.

The bodies that the Council addresses would be required to examine the proposals, recommendations, and opinions of the Council and to take a position on them in writing. If any body explicitly or tacitly refuses to examine its proposals, the Council would have the right to put the question of that body's accountability.

Speech by FRY President at Serbian Academy
92BA1141A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
16 Jun 92 pp 7-8

[Speech delivered by Dobrica Cosic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), to the Serbian Academy of Science and Art: "Serbia Between Rebirth and Catastrophe"]

[Text] *Necessary, fundamental changes in the social order of all institutions, in the quality of labor and production, and in the way of life. Through this meeting, the SANU [Serbian Academy of Science and Art] wants to contribute to finding the ways and means of saving the country from the immeasurable misfortunes that have beset it.*

The decision to organize a meeting devoted to the topic "The Serbian Nation at the Beginning of a New Era" was made a year and a half ago. At that time, the prospects for the Serbian nation's new era were fundamentally

different from the current prospects. Objective and subjective circumstances delayed this meeting, while history in Europe and Yugoslavia has proceeded towards ever-greater uncertainty at an insane speed, so that through some higher will or by chance, our discussion will be carried out in the most dramatic hours of our modern history.

I shall try, according to my convictions, to provide the primary terms of reference for our historic moment, about which I will speak in greater detail in my speech according to the agenda for the meeting.

The political, economic, and moral collapse of "self-management socialism" and of Titoist Yugoslavia during the 1980's caused the general crisis, stagnation, and entropy of all of society. With the collapse of Yugoslavia and the failure of Titoism, both of the prevalent ideologies on our soil in the 20th century—Yugoslavism and totalitarian socialism—were defeated. The scale, depth, and consequences of this historic revolution are unforeseeable at this time.

Slow Democratic Transformation

It seems to me that the following is certain:

- Serbian society is undergoing a slow and inconsistent democratic transformation.
- The existing order, with its institutions, is amorphous, conservative, lacking the necessary developmental energies.
- The economy is experiencing a decline in terms of production, investment, and technology, and is moving towards a crisis point.
- Education is extensive and inappropriate to contemporary civilization and the needs of society.
- Cultural and artistic institutions are undergoing distinct functional degradation.
- The development of science has been halted by bureaucratism, the profound economic crisis, and the departure of thousands of young researchers and creative minds.
- The urbanization of our land is elemental and primitive.
- The civilizational status of Serbia is very low.
- Inactivity and poor work, large masses of unemployed people, low morale, civic irresponsibility, the spiritual neglect of the people, and the frightening criminalization of the economy, politics, Belgrade, and the cities are rendering our society incapable of emerging from the crisis in which we have landed, not only because of our own fault.
- Antagonized ideologies from the civil war borne by political parties, renewed by revanchism and young forces of the disgruntled movement, and increasing

poverty and the rapid impoverishment of the people, with social and political stresses and encouragement by foreign factors, are swelling towards an explosion, chaos, rebellion.

- To the younger generation, Serbia is less and less a fatherland, job, and home, so that in the quest for a better and more sensible life, they are taking their labor potential, knowledge, and talents out into the world.
- Albanian secessionism and unresolved Serbo-Albanian relations have transformed the Kosovo issue into a factor of permanent pressure on Serbia and weaken its internal cohesion and significance in the world.
- Through a tectonic change in the world constellation and in the balance of power in the eighth decade, the wartime goals of the enemies of the Serbian nation in World Wars I and II are being realized during peacetime: the breakup of Yugoslavia and the splitting up of the Serbian people.
- The Serbian national policy of both the government and the opposition in the process of Yugoslav disintegration and in the post-Tito era, burdened by ideological mistakes, unprepared for pivotal events and powerful and organized foreign and internal opponents, is ill-suited to the balance of power and the demands of the times and world in which we live.

The worst thing has befallen us: Through the breakup of Yugoslavia, two centuries of our liberation struggle for all Serbs to live in one state are being annulled; Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are threatened by a revival of the Ustashi movement and militant Islam; they are frightened by renewed genocide, forced into a horrible defensive war against chauvinistic-Ustashi Croatia and the Muslim jihad; we are punished through banishment from the world community; we are condemned to a long term of suffering, humiliation, exodus, assimilation. We repay the crimes that are committed against us with crimes, and sometimes we become so dehumanized that we no longer recognize ourselves. In the name of the world's "new order," we are even threatened with the "dragon's hammer," i.e., missile bombardment.

The sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro imposed by the Security Council, if they are not lifted as soon as possible, the prospects of which are minimal, will result in the paralysis of the economy and of all of society, meaning unforeseeable misfortune and suffering. But the image of the Serbian people in the world, through the powers of totalitarian propaganda, the world media, has been disfigured by ideological lies, racist hatred, and tyrannical nonsense. In part, we Serbs are ourselves very much responsible for this sort of Serbophobia. With the collapse of the state that was our fundamental national goal for a century and a half, the onset of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict and wars, and our isolation from the world in which we live, we are in many

regards at the critical point of our historic existence. The new era is being proclaimed to Serbs as the worst of the old era. How to shorten it is our first existential question, something that will be answered by this meeting.

Disappointment, anger, and despair, combined with disorder and divisions within in and among us, are inducing panic and spontaneity in us, where reason and good intentions are the weakest elements, while force and evil intentions are the strongest ones. To save ourselves from the abyss of history into which we are sinking, into which the evil forces of the past and present-day world are throwing us, with a renewal of strength for surviving even under the most difficult conditions, we need a detailed, established understanding of history, a highly critical eye directed towards ourselves and everything, realistic awareness in perceiving the realities of the contemporary world, a precise assessment of our strengths, the introduction of intellectual and moral factors to the leadership nucleus of society, and rationality in everything with which life presents us.

For Changes Without Subversion

The time has come for major and rapid changes, which to this day occur through determinations and extortion of our historic growth and through the activities of foreign factors that are becoming decisive in the contemporary world. Our generation has faced epochal challenges: to intelligently handle the changes facing the Serbian people and their society. These changes must also affect our civilian and national consciousness, value system, and even the meaning of life.

Thus, we are forced to redesignate national and social goals and the gamut of general and individual values; we are compelled to make truly fundamental changes in the social order, in all institutions, in the quality of labor and production, in the way of life. But these changes cannot be carried out voluntarily, subversively, spontaneously; they can succeed if they are well thought out, evolutionary, and in accordance with the contemporary world and our best traditions. The necessity of radical change in the existing situation in Serbia brings with it the temptation of subversive activities: using all means and proclaiming the old to be the new. The failure to recognize this danger seriously threatens the value and meaning of intellectual commitment today.

We must seek a way out of the present-day situation of existential threat to the entire Serbian nation through a new philosophy of survival and development, through the creation of a new national policy, through humanistic harmonization between the means and the ends, through the transfer of the fate of the country to the collective mind and to new people who are ready and able to carry out the great rebirth. How, with what, and in what direction? That question can no longer be answered by politics alone; rather, it must come from the intellectual and moral strength of the people.

The objective circumstances have burdened the prospective goals of our meeting with exceptional responsibilities and new intellectual and moral risks. They are even contained in the names of the factors of tragic situation of the Serbian nation today. Only by genuinely and universally recognizing the present-day situation and setting out a future course free of ideology can we achieve the cognitive goal of our dialogue. In this regard one can mention the fundamental program tasks whose completion will bring about the transformation of Serbian society. And at today's fateful crossroads, Serbia faces either democratic, economic, and civilizational rebirth or national catastrophe.

Through this meeting, the Serbian Academy of Science and Art wants to contribute to finding the ways and means for saving the country from the immeasurable misfortunes that have beset it. By offering knowledge and ideas, we want to be a "ray of hope" in the Serbian nation, hope for the possibility of controlling our own destiny and for the establishment of a more calm future. We intellectual workers are aware that the age in which thinkers believed that they were or could be creators of history is over. Thinkers have been replaced by "technicians of history," led by politicians, while they have raised questions about—if not in fact rendered senseless—the new era's faith in reason and fantasy, so that many of the results of the actions of these "technicians of history" today evoke only fear for humanity's future.

We do not want to predict the future, because predicting the future is a very risky mental game. We want to apply our experience from the past and understanding of today to cast a few rays of light on our tomorrow. Through this meeting, we want to affirm our responsibility for what happens in the future. The past is given to us, Poper says, and rightly so: "But already today we are morally responsible for the future, and we must do what is best without ideological sunglasses, even if the prospects for such a thing are not the most favorable ones. And the best thing is that which is least violent, that which reduces suffering."

Honored guests, we want our discussion of the present and future of the Serbian nation in this building of science to be imbued with the sense of the inscription on the temple of Delphi: "Know yourself." To Plato's Socrates, in a dialogue with Crito, this means: Be sensible. But being sensible is only knowing about knowledge and ignorance; thus, knowing oneself means knowing what one knows and what one does not know.

If we understand something of this knowledge from our discussions about the Serbian nation at the beginning of the new era, if we succeed in proclaiming this knowledge to our contemporaries and motivate them to rise to the virtues of truth and consciousness, then we will justify society's expectations of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art, Dobrica Cosic said in closing.

Serbian Academy Meeting on Ethnic Issues

92BA1131E Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
20 Jun 92 p 9

[Article by S. Kljakic: "Answers to Ethnic Issues Are Being Sought"]

[Text] After five days, the scientific meeting entitled "The Serbian Nationality at the Beginning of the New Era," held in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, completed its work yesterday.

Speaking on the topic "Challenges of Ethnic Identity," Dr. Velimir B. Popovic took the position that a development strategy could not be formulated without answering the question "Who are we?" Dr. Popovic defined the content of the concept of ethnic identity from the standpoint of archetypal psychology, also including in his analysis the problem of the origin, foundations, and transmission of ethnic identity, its transformation and distinction from personal identity.

The Danger Contained in Continuity of the Government

Guided by the main thesis of his paper, to the effect that the long-term destiny of the Serbian people depends on resolving the present crisis, Dr. Slobodan Samardzic focused his analysis on the Serbian nationality's political conditions over the past five years. He particularly analyzed the character of the government in Serbia and the question of its legitimacy, establishing the continuity of that government in its various phases from the time of the so-called antibureaucratic revolution, then the election campaign in wartime and establishment of the so-called third Yugoslavia. Samardzic devoted particular attention to reconstructing the technology of government which has ensured that continuity of authority. As a trend, this continuity contains a danger both for the future of the state and political future on the one hand, as well as for general existential future of the Serbian nationality on the other, Dr. Samardzic said.

Dr. Dragoljub Kavran, professor, delivered a paper on the essential changes in the public sector and government administration, pointing to possible strategies for reforming the government administration and problems in determining the content of that reform.

Vojislav Stanovcic, member of the academy, analyzed in his paper the importance of the principle of the rule of law and the difficulties in achieving it. He started from the premise that the rule of law is one of the most basic principles and that respect for it is the ticket to enter the group of civilized countries, and he pointed to the constant violation of those principles over the last five decades. Along with the other problems, Professor Stanovcic also spoke about democracy as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the legitimacy of power and the validity of laws, because the principle of the rule of law presupposes a relatively rational law. It incorporates and embodies the most important achievements of civilization with respect to man's protection, that is,

human rights. Acquiring legitimacy of a government through an election is only one element, while the lawful and rational exercise of use of authority is a still more important element of its legitimacy.

Justice Is Opposed to the Law

Dr. Miodrag Orlic, professor, delivered a paper on the topic "The Civil Law of the Serbian People—A Conflict Between Two Conceptions," analyzing the opposition of the civil law and its institutions taken over from European law to the legal mindset that exists in the Serbian people, sometimes even predominantly, and which is compressed in the concept of justice.

The concept of justice gives rise to the idea that the legal system does not come up to that concept, which is why a number of institutions of the civil law, notably the institution of property, have been unable to establish themselves.

Axiomatically laying the groundwork for the problem of the end of utopia—destruction of the future, Miodrag Perisic spoke about the communist era, from its founding in 1917 to the collapse of the communist world, in terms of the interweaving of the analytical plane and the essayist's rumination on human destiny. Perisic identified the achievements of that totalitarian system both at the level of the individual and also at the level of large human groupings such as the nationality.

The barrenness in both areas, he observed, grew up out of the system which turned the exceptional nature of tragic events into everyday life and was helpless to respond to any challenge of structural crises. As convincingly testified to by the Yugoslav example, the crises were resolved on a personal basis, rather than structurally.

It is possible to overcome the present crisis, Perisic said, by activating all the resources of modern knowledge and through a basic reshaping of the medium of politics so that it turns toward that knowledge. After all, the Serbian people has no time to revive conceptions shaped or defeated by 1945 as it confronts the new era.

Toward the "Good Society"

Dr. Svetozar Stojanovic, professor, spoke about the blueprint of the "good society" between one millennium and the next. His premise was that discussion of the "good society" from the leftwing perspective requires reassessment of the traditions of Social Democracy, which with the fall of communism has won a victory on the left. In the blueprint of the "good society," the ecosphere must have its place, just like the contribution that has been made by present-day feminism.

In this period of postliberalism and postsocialism, social and environmental democracy would be the foundation of the "good society" whose architecture Professor Stojanovic sees as a dichotomy. At the primary level of social organization, the principle of distribution

according to work would apply, but at the secondary level, according to needs, which would accomplish a combination of the operation of capitalistic production and Social-Democratic distribution. In that kind of dichotomous structure, social and environmental democracy would prevent the rich and the well informed from appropriation without any limits whatsoever.

Touching upon the problem of the new world order, Professor Stojanovic emphasized that it will either concentrate on concern about humanity or there will be no humanity.

Several rejoinders were exchanged at the end of this meeting's work.

[Box, p 9]

Unification of Serbs as the First Task

Following the disintegration of what until now has been AVNOJ-Brioni [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia-Brioni] Yugoslavia, which should not be mourned, the Serbian people must seek unification of all Serbs as its priority task. The possible inclusion of others in a community could be only a secondary objective.

This is one of the key positions in the paper of Miodrag Jovicic, member of the academy, who spoke the day before yesterday during the afternoon session of the meeting in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

As Academician Jovicic put it, Serbia's objective must be a governmental community of united Serbian lands that would include even parts of Serbism living outside the borders of Serbia and Montenegro, and the optimum form of government would be a regional state with broad autonomy of each region.

General Says Fear of Intervention Unfounded

92BA1131D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 p 4

[Unattributed article summarizing interview with Colonel General Zivota Panic, chief of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, published in the weekly VOJSKA; place and date of interview not given: "There Is No Basis for Fear of Military Intervention"]

[Text] There is no rational reason for military intervention against FR [Federal Republic] Yugoslavia, nor any basis for defeatism and fear that someone will bombard our cities or any other vital targets, declared Colonel General Zivota Panic, chief of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia [VJ], in an interview published in yesterday's issue of the weekly VOJSKA.

Observing that that possibility must be seriously evaluated in order to avert any surprise, Panic said that the government leadership has already offered sufficient

evidence of its commitment to a peaceful solution of the crisis and that the army will act in accordance with that commitment.

"We are aware that any unnecessary confrontation with the international community, which has pronounced these rigorous sanctions against us, would only encourage advocates of a military option, and then war and intervention would be inevitable," Panic said.

If in spite of the readiness to contribute to the restoration of peace, there should nevertheless be intervention from outside, "we will oppose it with all available means, and we are already prepared for that, regardless of all the problems," General Panic said categorically.

In that case, he said, an aggressor would have to count on all-out war, which presupposes "large-scale casualties of the parties to the conflict and also corresponding reprisal on our part."

Commenting on FR Yugoslavia's military-political position, Gen. Panic emphasized that neighboring countries, except for Romania, have taken a "hostile position" and "quite openly are advancing old territorial claims, at the same time inciting their own ethnic minorities to rebellion and disloyalty," neglecting the fact that, as he put it, the minorities would also suffer in the conflict provoked in that way.

Panic judged to be naive the "belief that a change of regime would automatically weaken the pressure on Serbia."

"To the contrary, a forcible removal of the regime would result in deeper divisions in Serbia, and that could be the prelude to a general civil war with tragic consequences," Panic said.

Pointing to some of the results in accomplishing the process of transformation of the Army of Yugoslavia, Gen. Panic said that all the specific organizational issues will be settled by the relevant law, the draft of which is already going through proceedings. He mentioned in this connection that there is not a single segment of the Army that has not already been affected by the transformation.

"We have formed and put in place the commands of strategic groupings and operational structures of all three branches of the armed forces: Along the main axes, we have combat-ready and fully manned coordinated tactical units; we effectively control about 2,700 km of the national land border and 110 at sea; we are organizing a new system of required military service; we are recruiting soldiers under contract, and we are completely depoliticized, so that in the legal sense we are a nonparty and government army defending the homeland exclusively," Gen. Panic said.

The chief of the General Staff also announced that all secondary military schools would soon be closed and that noncommissioned officers would come from training those who had graduated from civilian secondary schools, and this would be done during the time

envisaged for required military service. He explained that a single military academy of the Army of Yugoslavia would be formed from the present six military academies.

Commenting on the fact that the separation of four republics had deprived the Army of Yugoslavia of considerable military facilities, Gen. Panic said that there are alternative solutions.

General Reveals Counterintelligence Secrets

92BA1147A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
12 Jun 92 pp 30-33

[Interview with Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, former head of the Counterintelligence Service, by Svetislav Spasojevic; place and date not given: "Testimony by Maj. Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic: Conspiracy Uncovered"]

[Text] *The first information indicating that the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] is making preparations for its own armed forces; The nucleus of the military officers corps at SDA headquarters and the role of Halil, Kemo, and Adnan; Details of confidential information about "green berets"; Meeting with "surprised" Alija Izetbegovic, codes and messages, film recorded on a secret mission; Kostic, Adzic, and Izetbegovic meet in Skopje; Sudden and tragic turn of events: The road from agreement to war was crossed in less than one day.*

Major General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, the head of the Security Directorate of the Yugoslav Army until 8 May of this year, when he, together with 37 other generals, was unexpectedly retired, talks to NIN about how a terrible peace was exchanged for an even more terrible war, about the collapse of the Yugoslav illusion, about the onset of irrational times, and about the people living in them when murder that is not preceded by torture has attained the status of humane treatment. Finally, he talks about treason as a rational pastime, about cowards and other heroes....

The word, more than anything else, often bears witness to intentions. Thus, this recollection, the former top man in the KOS [Counterintelligence Service] believes, is the repayment of a debt to the known and unknown KOS agents, many of whom have disappeared forever in the dirty civil war.

By examining Vasiljevic's testimony, as well as the public commentary that will certainly follow in its wake, the NIN reader will have the opportunity to judge for himself where the true culprit should be sought for this war and the thousands of people who are dead, missing, refugees, or permanently maimed. Is it the military leadership, i.e., the replaced generals, or is it in fact the people who replaced them?

Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic is 54 years old, with 39 years of military service. According to the letter of the law, he does not meet either of the conditions for retirement. This is what he has to say:

"With a white flag and two other comrades, I came to the agreed spot between the towns of Klepac and Visic on 8 May in the late afternoon. The first was Serbian town, the second Croatian. We were supposed to exchange two prisoners for 17 of our soldiers, a wounded pilot, and the remains of officer Dragan Bajramovic, the son of Sejdo Bajramovic, a member of the Presidency. I thought that the exchange would transpire peacefully, because it was well organized. They began shooting, so that we spent a long time lying in some debris and barely got out alive. I arrived at the barracks in Trebinje late at night, after finding my way back in a roundabout way. The officers gave me strange looks. They knew who I was and why I was there. At first I thought that something terrible had happened to my family. They told me that it had been announced on television that I was retired. I breathed a sigh of relief...."

Thus, a man who knows a great deal had left the top military leadership.

The official name of the service that Gen. Vasiljevic headed is the Security Directorate of the SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense]. In the jargon, it is the KOS—the Counterintelligence Service. In fact, the roots of the latter name go back to the postwar years, when the Third Section of the OZN [Department for the Security of the People], which concerned itself with Army security, bore that name. Before the civil war began, there were around a thousand officers working for the KOS. Without doubt, it is the most reliable, the most capable, and the best organized security service in the country. Compared to the approximately 300,000 soldiers, including some 50,000 officers, that the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] had prior to this war, the KOS is small.

[Spasojevic] Gen. Vasiljevic, has the KOS, like the Army, emerged from this war ethnically pure?

[Vasiljevic] The service is part of the Yugoslav Army, and it has been overtaken by all the same troubles that the armed forces have been through. However, I am afraid of the consequences especially of the paranoid fear of everything that is not Serbian, or of anyone who is not a Serb. People are leaving the KOS, which is not to say that they are being forced out, simply because they are, say, Macedonians. There is no evidence whatsoever of any sort of treason committed by them. On the contrary, all indications are that they were dedicated, diligent, capable, industrious.... Their decisions about leaving the service say more about the state of our souls than they do about the unfortunate people who linked their destinies to the Yugoslav Army.

[Spasojevic] What is the predominant focus of the KOS?

[Vasiljevic] The list is very long, but the shortest response would be this: systematizing all information

relating to events within the Army itself, keeping records on acts that the enemy has committed or even intends to commit, analyzing everything that is happening outside the area that belongs to the Army or that is directed towards it, following everything that is going on abroad that concerns Army security and, naturally Yugoslavia. All the information that comes in over the course of a day is processed overnight and printed in 10 or so copies, which are then provided to the most responsible people in the morning. These are the so-called daily reports. Besides them, there are also problem reports, in which certain phenomena are analyzed in greater detail. Very selective information is used for them, and they are accessible to an even smaller number of people from the staff of the Supreme Command and Presidency. These bulletins are each numbered. Reproducing them is prohibited, and after they have been read they are returned.

[Spasojevic] Today it is known that the Army failed in Slovenia. I assume that certain lessons were learned from the Slovene skirmishes....

[Vasiljevic] While war was raging in Croatia, the most important thing for the KOS was to learn reliably and in a timely fashion which side Macedonia, and most of all Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H], would be taking. We tried our hardest to be present at the most important events and not to be surprised. The central republic was of inestimable importance to the former Yugoslavia. An enormous military potential was located there: factories in which various types of equipment and weaponry were produced, the most modern airport, a multitude of barracks, missile units, airplanes....

[Spasojevic] The armed forces left Macedonia without a single shot being fired....

[Vasiljevic] Yes, I was there personally. That is how the civilian authorities wanted it, and we respected that. We had precise information about everything that was happening in Macedonia. Naturally, we informed the military leadership about this in time, and they passed it further up to the civilian authorities.

[Spasojevic] Things were completely different with Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Vasiljevic] It was absolutely necessary to keep the police from being transformed into paramilitary units. This system was first applied in Slovenia, and then in Croatia. First, the people who are not reliable are removed from the police force. This usually meant policemen of other nationalities. They are replaced by party cadre. In this way, the police, overnight, becomes a national armed force, or rather a party-based one. In Bosnia, we managed through our people to postpone this process for a certain period of time. If we had not done this, then we would have had a Muslim military force of around 30,000 well-trained people as early as the end of last year or the beginning of this year. That is the equivalent of three divisions.

[Spasojevic] Is it possible to conclude that in the then JNA, which at the time was fighting a war in Croatia, there was a certain fear about the formation of paramilitary forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Specifically, in that case it would have had forces behind its back, which is impermissible in military strategy.

[Vasiljevic] I would not call it fear. It was only an ordinary precaution. The service that I headed delayed the transformation of police forces into party-based armed forces and halted, at least for a fairly long time, the doubling in size of the reserve units and their training for combat during peacetime.

[Spasojevic] You managed to do all that thanks to the assistance of influential people from the very leadership ranks of the Party of Democratic Action?

[Vasiljevic] Contact was established with Alija Delimustafic, the top man at the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of B-H. Thanks to this, that MUP recognized the jurisdiction of the federal SUP [Secretariat for Internal Affairs]. A large number of federal inspectors went to all the security centers of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were there as observers, but also as monitors. We were interested in preserving peace in B-H, and thus free passage across that republic as well. It was essential, at any price, to preserve the link between Serbia and Knin Krajina. We established 39 points along the road from Belgrade to Knin. They were checked by the police together with the armed forces.

In this way, we actually thwarted the attempt by Jerko Doko, the minister of defense of B-H, to activate the territorial defense force and impose a state of emergency on the central republic. This was not accepted by Minister Delimustafic, who guaranteed that the regular police can only do its own job.

At that time—i.e., at the end of last year—we first learned through our people that the Muslim Party of Democratic Action was trying to form its own armed force and that it was procuring arms for that purpose. To be more precise: I learned from a reliable source that there was a nucleus of military officers at SDA headquarters in Sarajevo. It consisted of three former Army officers.

[Spasojevic] How did you arrive at that information?

[Vasiljevic] The KOS had two of its people in the very top ranks of the Muslim party.

[Spasojevic] What has become of them today?

[Vasiljevic] They are doing their jobs.

[Spasojevic] They have not been uncovered?

[Vasiljevic] I told you that they are still doing their jobs. Thus, one of them told us in December 1991, by way of trustworthy contacts, the nicknames of the three former

officers. They are Halil, Kemo, and Adnan. These men are Sefer Halilovic, Kemal Removic, and Hajrudin Heca.

They were making plans for the party's military organization. We also uncovered very quickly the names of the active officers whom they were recruiting for their future armed forces.

[Spasojevic] Did the KOS have information on them in its documentation?

[Vasiljevic] Of course we did. The third one was previously thrown out of the Army as a Muslim extremist, and the first two were deserters back during the war in Slovenia.

These were the first indications of an attempt by the SDA to have a military organization. Because of this, we in the KOS were forced to evaluate all the officers that we had previously identified as extreme Muslim nationalists. We carried out a detailed analysis and intensified our observation. Even then, we had clear knowledge, materially documented, of what was being prepared for in B-H.

[Spasojevic] What does "materially documented" mean?

[Vasiljevic] At that time, we had documents, conversations recorded by tape recorders and cameras. We got hold of the entire organizational structure of the Muslim armed forces. We used cameras to record illegal meetings by military personnel. We knew that a Republican Command had been formed and that it consisted of two parts: the military and the political crisis commands. There are nine regional commands in the territory of B-H and one each in Kosmet and Sandzak.

[Spasojevic] Did you know the names of all the members of the regional crisis commands? I am particularly interested in the people who made up the secret organization in Kosmet and Sandzak.

[Vasiljevic] All the information that we had about the organization in Kosmet and Sandzak we gave immediately to the Serbian State Security Service. No one ever told us what they did with it!

[Spasojevic] I suppose that today Serbian State Security knows the names of and all the other information about the people who comprise the nucleus of the conspiratorial organization in the southern province and in Sandzak?

[Vasiljevic] At that time, we in the KOS never concerned ourselves with that in any greater detail, but we gave them all the information that we came across on time.

[Spasojevic] On what principle was Alija Izetbegovic's military organized?

[Vasiljevic] Because it was organized by former JNA officers, it was set up along the same lines. The Patriotic League of Nations [PLN] of B-H was made up of mobile

units, units with a regional structure for protecting inhabited places and territories, and special-purpose units—for special tasks of a sovereign-territorial character. They are known by the public as "green berets." However, this term is applied to the entire SDA armed force, while their official name is the Patriotic League of Nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The existence of that organization was a state secret for more than three months. From December 1991 until March of this year.

[Spasojevic] Was it a secret to the country's military and state leadership?

[Vasiljevic] No, not at all. As always, we gathered detailed information and sent it to the appropriate place. Everyone knew about the existence of the "green berets," about their structure and goals, from the federal secretary for national defense to the vice president of the Presidency. Thus, they knew in time that there existed a secret Muslim military organization (the PLN), which comprised around 50,000 more than well-organized people, nearly half of whom were already armed even at the very outset. Thus, well-organized but poorly armed. The KOS showed the state leadership in time that the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosmet, and Sandzak was preparing for war.

[Spasojevic] At that time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was still not recognized. Did you expect the Presidency to authorize you to arrest the leading people in the Muslim secret army?

[Vasiljevic] What we wanted is not of consequence; what is important to know is that the Presidency remained silent, while Branko Kostic, the vice president, said publicly that the Army would never leave B-H! The voluminous and secret information that we sent to the State Presidency on the creation and organization of Muslim paramilitary forces included a blank page at the end on which the members of the Presidency could write down their remarks. They did not do this either. They simply did not know what they wanted.

[Spasojevic] Is it possible that your information was not good, which is to say accurate?

[Vasiljevic] I will demonstrate to you with just one detail how intelligence work is done. Through its man, for example, the KOS got its hands on a command map which contained details on the military forces in a certain region of B-H. The forces of the "Patriotic League of Nations of B-H" were indicated in red, while the Army was in blue. I really do not think that the Presidency could have expected more from us.

[Spasojevic] I notice that you insist on the fact that there was extensive documentation for all your assertions?

[Vasiljevic] That is very important in my job. There cannot be any improvisation whatsoever. For example, we had photographs or recordings of the majority of the people in the regional crisis commands. Naturally, we photographed and recorded them secretly and by

"phono," meaning by tape recorder and hidden camera, as in the "Spegejl affair." A camera is hidden before a meeting, in a pot of flowers, for example, or it is built into a thick book. This is how we found out what was talked about at these secret meetings, and who participated in them. We generated secret photo and television documentation.

Then we worked up an exact plan on what had to be done. We formed a command for coordinating this activity and appointed mixed units for seizing weapons. It was necessary that the republican MUP of B-H, the federal SUP, and the Army take part in that disarming campaign. In the end, we concluded that we would not do anything until representatives of all three nations support this campaign. Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and Kljuic did not do this, so that the whole thing fell through!

[Spasojevic] And after that the four-member Presidency remained silent!?

[Vasiljevic] When the staff of the Supreme Command realized that no response could be expected any longer from the Presidency, I was ordered to establish contact with Alija Izetbegovic.

[Spasojevic] Was this done behind the Presidency's back?

[Vasiljevic] No, not at all. I was given the task, by the most immediate part of the Staff, of meeting with Izetbegovic and of telling him in great detail about everything that I had found out with my people in the KOS. I set up the meeting with the president of the Presidency of B-H through Alija Delimustafic, the minister of internal affairs. We met in his office on 5 February of this year. Delimustafic was also present, but he did not join in the conversation.

At the very outset I told him that the purpose of my visit was to inform him of the secret military organizations in the republic of which he was the leader. When I recall that conversation today, it is clear to me that my counterpart was trying the whole time to leave me with the impression of a surprised man, a man caught off guard. He contended that the idea of a SDA military organization was ridiculous.

[Spasojevic] You had voluminous documentation that you could use to show that you were right?

[Vasiljevic] I told him, and I documented it, that I knew of the existence of secret republican and regional crisis commands, and that they were organized from the level of republic to local communities. About units of territorial defense and plans drawn up for attacking military targets. I told him that the scenario is the same as in Croatia and that the secret Muslim military organization had formulated plans to kidnap military personnel as well. My counterpart was an experienced and shrewd man, impossible to confuse. He said that he could not believe my story and that he was inclined to believe that

someone had palmed all this information off on me in order to make a fool out of me! I was forced to show him a very essential document.

[Spasojevic] Which one?

[Vasiljevic] The organizational command, or rather the instructions for organizing the Patriotic League of Nations of B-H. This document was encoded at one place. Based on that detail, he was able to accurately determine where and at what point we got hold of that document. Although I was aware of that, I was forced to show it to him. I noticed that he looked at that part a little longer and more attentively. People in certain jobs are used to observing details that go unnoticed by ordinary people. It was completely clear to me that despite a concerted effort, he was unable to figure out where the document had come from.

Although he was surrounded, he was unwilling to surrender. He told me that based on this platform document he did not see how, as I contended, this organization was illegal and directed against the Yugoslav People's Army. On the contrary, Izetbegovic concluded: The organization was formed to protect the Muslim nation if it were exposed to aggression.

I showed him the next document, which contained detailed information on the designations for encoded communication. Here, for example, were the codes for messages—intercept military column, capture it, surround barracks, attack depot, destroy tank. Alija Izetbegovic is actually very good at the game. He told me that there was no seal on that document, and that perhaps it had been palmed off on me.

[Spasojevic] Was there really no seal?

[Vasiljevic] No, there wasn't. My last trump card was a film clip taken at a secret meeting. I told him that I would have to show it to him. That was when he gave up and said that he knew nothing about the establishment of a secret Muslim army, and that he would immediately look into what they are doing at SDA headquarters. He assured me that the Muslim nation will never be turned against the Army. He added that he had learned many lessons from the Croatian situation, and that he was wise enough to not allow Bosnia to have its own Vukovar.

[Spasojevic] Was there a danger that Mr. Izetbegovic would discover from the documents that you showed him who handed them over to you?

[Vasiljevic] I did not show him the documents that would have made it very easy for him to figure out our contact, who was working in his immediate vicinity. Specifically, there were two people at the very top of the Bosnia-Herzegovian government who were, and who remain to this day, in contact with the KOS. They did not know about each other.

[Spasojevic] Why did you even go to Sarajevo for this talk with Alija Izetbegovic?

[Vasiljevic] Why couldn't the Army go around Bosnia-Herzegovina, as some think, arresting those who are against it and Yugoslavia? That is not its job. My conversation was most of all preventative in nature. After my visit to Sarajevo, we sensed a perceptible slowdown in activities by the PLN forces. My assessment is that they were caught off guard by the fact that the KOS knew of their existence. Anyway, the PLN, or "green berets," degenerated into a criminal organization. After my meeting with the top man in the Party of Democratic Action, for example, there was a reexamination of how enormous sums of money were spent to buy weapons. In fact, a search was begun for the thieves who had exploited Muslim poor people by selling them weapons "to defend themselves against bloodthirsty Serbs who are coming to slaughter them." Practically speaking, there was a crackdown on wartime profiteers and criminals who possibly compromised the justified initiative by Muslims to organize themselves for the purpose of self-defense.

[Spasojevic] In the Army you are considered a person who is more than well informed about events and people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Were you the main KOS agent in the Second Military District in Sarajevo for a long time?

[Vasiljevic] I assume that that is one of the reasons that the staff of the Supreme Command ordered me back to Sarajevo to make preparations for the meeting of Branko Kostic, the vice president of the Presidency, and Gen. Blagoje Adzic, the acting federal secretary for national defense, with Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Spasojevic] When was that, exactly?

[Vasiljevic] At the end of April of this year. Consequently, the first variant presupposed a meeting between only three participants, Kostic, Adzic, and Izetbegovic. The second one would have many more participants. In addition to those three, it was necessary to consider legitimate representatives of all three nations in B-H.

[Spasojevic] Gen. Vasiljevic, were you told in advance what had to be discussed at this meeting?

[Vasiljevic] Of course. The date 27 April was approaching, when the Constitution of the new state was to be promulgated in the Federal Assembly in Belgrade. Through that act, the JNA lost legitimacy in B-H. This meant that it was necessary to agree in Sarajevo to the framework for talks on the fate of the Army in the central republic. That is also the reason that the second, or expanded, variant presupposed that the talks would also be attended by an expanded delegation from the staff of the Supreme Command. Before flying to Sarajevo, it was pointed out to me that the meeting could be held in Belgrade, Podgorica, Skopje, or some other city. Only Sarajevo was not considered. The contact, once again, was the inevitable Delimustafic. Izetbegovic came to the meeting at one of Delimustafic's private properties. I believe that it is called "Monik." The meeting lasted 40 minutes. He agreed to talk with Kostic and Adzic, and

said that he would tell me the next day whether the meeting would be with the expanded list of participants and where it would be held. I think that he avoided me all of the next day and the day after that until noon, but then we agreed by telephone that the meeting would be between the three of them and that it would be held in Skopje or Ohrid. He did not agree to Podgorica, which is where Branko Kostic was at the time.

[Spasojevic] That was at the end of April. Even though real warfare had not yet begun, there was already a lot of shooting in Sarajevo?

[Vasiljevic] I left Belgrade for Sarajevo in a military helicopter, and took a personnel carrier from the airport into the city. I asked Izetbegovic whether he would be traveling from Sarajevo to Skopje in an airplane of the B-H government. He responded that that was out of the question. He said that he could travel to Skopje to meet with Branko Kostic and Blagoje Adzic only by military airplane, and that under the condition that the armed forces guarantee his safety. The meeting was held on 26 April in Skopje.

[Spasojevic] On that day, Izetbegovic in Skopje, after the meeting, declared that an agreement had been reached on the peaceful and gradual withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia. That same evening, the Presidency of B-H decided that the Army had to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately! The road from the platform for talks to total war was very short; it was crossed in less than one day. This sudden and tragic turn of events surprised the public. How did the KOS react?

[Vasiljevic] To be honest, we too were surprised that an agreement between responsible people would be rejected in such a short time. The KOS, however, had at its disposal a secret directive from the Territorial Defense Force of B-H, or rather the PLN, concerning moves to forcibly "capture sovereignty." The first stage according to this plan was to organize and prepare for fighting with the Army, while the second stage was to chase Yugoslav soldiers out of the territory of the "independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina." As a service, we got hold of that confidential document in time, and presented it to the staff of the Supreme Command of the Presidency of Yugoslavia.

[Spasojevic] You will never say how you got hold of that document?

[Vasiljevic] Silence about that is one of the sacred rules of the job that I performed for decades. I can only tell you that it was one of those contacts at the very top of the B-H government.

[Spasojevic] Is it a Muslim?

[Vasiljevic] Well...yes. It is someone with a Yugoslav orientation. Spasojevic, you must not think that he feels like a traitor right now. I have been through a lot with this person, and I know that he regards this action of his as patriotism—a view I also share. I am not certain that

the job performed by the KOS officer who received the document is any less delicate. There is a regular system of contacts that is disrupted by war. But there is a special type, even during times such as these, when the situation is urgent and when the job is more important than saving one's neck. That job was done by the KOS officer in Sarajevo. Later on, he was to be pulled from the column headed by Gen. Milutin Kukanjac. Although he was interrogated, his role in acquiring the plans for the attack on the JNA remained a secret. He was exchanged with other prisoners for Vahid Karavelic, the main commander in eastern Bosnia. Karavelic was a military deserter whom we apprehended in a campaign.

[Spasojevic] Although we have been talking here about the work of the Security Directorate of the JNA, we keep coming back to the role of the State Presidency in your work. What do the four members of the rump Presidency do when you, or rather the KOS, officially notifies and warns them that the Yugoslav People's Army is going to be frontally assaulted in a neighboring state?

[Vasiljevic] The greatest success in military intelligence work is when you get your hands on enemy commands. Practically speaking, the KOS got hold of a directive on the republican level which was used in the military, but also in the political sense. As the top man in the KOS, I participated in the work of the staff of the Supreme Command. I know that the allegation that the Presidency was not informed by the KOS in time is untrue. Supposedly, they lacked information, so that they were "unable to reach a decision on time"! That is untrue, and I can document it. Upon leaving the post of president of the Presidency, Borisav Jovic announced that all the segments of security had failed except for the military service, meaning the KOS. So how is it possible that this same service is not giving anything to the new top man, Vice President Branko Kostic?! It is simply not the truth. He could be right about one thing: The KOS has not made information directly available to Branko Kostic, because under the system it is not subordinate to him. The KOS is exclusively subordinate to the staff of the Supreme Command, meaning the federal secretary. All information is provided to the military leadership. There has been information, however, that we as a service insisted on providing to each member of the Presidency, in addition to the military leadership.

Data on Croatian Army Activities in Bosnia

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[Unattributed article: "From Documents on Crimes by and Involvement of Croatian Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Brigades of Croatian Armed Forces on Battlefields in Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[Text] Croatia has been shifting strong armed forces into the territory of the Bosnian Sava basin for a short time. Around 6,000 members of the ZNG [National Guard

Corps] in Cazin alone. Powerful groups of Croatian Armed Forces [HV] in the Livno, Tomislavgrad, and Kupres area as well.

Based on the abundant material available to the competent state organs of the FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia, it is evident that Croatia is involved in war activities in the Bosnian Sava basin, in the Livno, Kupres, and Tomislavgrad area, and in other locations in western Herzegovina.

Croatia has been shifting strong armed forces into the territory of the Bosnian Sava basin (Bosanski Brod, Odzak, Modrica, Derventa, Bosanski Samac, Brcko, Orasje) for a short time.

Between 15 and 21 February of this year, 15 tanks and 12 155-mm howitzers were delivered to Bosanski Brod from Slavonski Brod. Since 4 April, two multibarrel rocket launchers, 500 shells for 120-mm mortars, and 30 Zolja antitank systems have been delivered to Bosanski Brod. And, as recently as 4 June, two tractor-trailer trucks of ammunition for tanks and 130-mm artillery pieces arrived in Bosanski Brod and Odzak.

Croatian Soldiers Training in Bosnian Woods

During March, 200 members of the Croatian Defense Force (HOS) arrived in the territory of Odzak opstina, while a month earlier, several hundred members of the National Guard Corps and Croatian Defense Force were engaged in military training in the woods between Derventa and Dobojo.

A battalion from the 99th Brigade of the National Guard Corps arrived in Slavonski Brod as reinforcement in that area. On 10 April, there were 3,000 members of the Croatian armed forces in Bosanski Brod, as well as 15 tanks, 10 personnel carriers, and a large number of (long-range) artillery pieces for fire support.

By 26 April, preparations were complete, after which the 108th Brigade of the National Guard Corps occupied Bosanski Brod and created the conditions for moving significant forces into that area.

In the Orasje region, the Croatian supreme command is undertaking measures and opening up a new focal point. On 25 April, a diversionary-terrorist group was sent into the Gradacac, Modrica, and Orasje area, while according to the available data there were already around 6,000 members of the National Guard Corps in Cazin on 26 April, who were intended for operations toward Karlovac.

The presence of the following units of the Croatian armed forces was confirmed in the territory of the Bosnian Sava basin on 26 April: the 108th Brigade in Bosanski Brod, the main force of the 124th brigade in Derventa, and the 139th Brigade and part of the 1st Brigade of the Croatian armed forces in Bosanski Samac.

On 26 April, five tractor-trailer trucks with ammunition and weapons, together with two battalions of the

Croatian armed forces, left Zagreb for Bijeljina in order to attack and occupy that city.

Two days later, the command of the Croatian armed forces sent new forces into B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and delivered new arms to paramilitary formations in that republic. At the same time, artillery attacks on JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] barracks in northeastern Bosnia continued.

On the night of 9 and 10 May, the 122d and 133d Brigades of the National Guard Corps from Djakovo and Zupanja, with strong fire support, crossed the Sava east of Slavonski Brod, in the area of the town of Popoj, and extended their attack.

In all the larger cities of Croatia, mobilization took place on 16 May, with a continuation of movements of personnel, diversionary-terrorist groups, and equipment into B-H, together with insertions of military forces from abroad into the Derventa and Brcko areas, moving along the Koper-Zagreb-Bjelovar-Zupanja-Gunjene route. Three brigades of the Croatian armed forces were sent into the Derventa and Modrica region on 8 June for the purpose of definitively crushing the defenses in this part of the front. One of the brigades came from Zagreb, the second came from the Pakrac region, while the third came from the Sava basin. There are forces equivalent to five brigades of the Croatian armed forces in this area (the 103d, 108th, 124th, and 139th Brigades of the Croatian armed forces and parts of the 101st, 109th, and 131st Brigades of the Croatian armed forces), for the purpose of bisecting Bosnia-Herzegovina and later linking up with the Muslim-Croat forces.

Modrica Occupied by 108th and 103d Brigades of HV

On 27 May, Croatian forces brought antiair defense systems into the Derventa, Odzak, and Bosanski Brod areas by tractor-trailers, while the 143d Brigade was deployed in the Modrica and Derventa region at the end of May, together with the 102d in the Odzak region, and one battalion of the 101st Brigade in Brcko.

In conjunction with Muslim forces, the 108th and 103d Brigades of the Croatian armed forces occupied Modrica on 29 May, while a battalion of the Croatian armed forces was sent in on 3 June from Rijeka, by way of Zagreb.

With the help of armed groups from the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community, as well as forces from its own territory, Croatia has created a powerful military group in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Livno, Tomislavgrad, and Kupres area.

In January of this year, the Croatian Democratic Community and Croatian armed forces in this area numbered 7,000 to 8,000 people, organized in units up to the rank of battalion. At the end of February, smaller units of Croatian defense forces were created in Livno and Tomislavgrad, whose purpose was to attack Kupres and advance further toward Bugojno and Travnik.

On 29 March, Kupres was reinforced by one battalion of the Croatian armed forces from Imotski, and 15 tanks were delivered to the Livno-Sujica area, together with the same number of armored personnel carriers and a large number of 122-mm howitzers.

Croatian-Muslim Pact Seen as All-Out War Option

*92BA1132B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
21 Jun 92 p 7*

[Article by Ljubodrag Stojadinovic: "The Pact and War"]

[Text] The Croatian-Muslim military pact is the most recent contribution to the suspected possibility of total war. The Sarajevo-Zagreb axis is anti-Serb even in its preliminary definition, and on the basis of certain things that have been learned from documents that have been prepared, it has a greater obsession with Serbophobia than it does analytical dynamism to achieve the goals of the coalition.

The military alliance between Izetbegovic and Tudjman is not sensational in other respects, at least for those who have been following the militarization of their states. Without creation of a military coalition, it was not possible to even think of a global ethnic map, that is, of drawing the borders of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia]. So much for Tudjman's ambitions. Alija's are somewhat different because his dream is a unitary state based on the values of Islamic fundamentalism, and in this stage of the struggle for Allah's breakthrough to the West, the Croatian Army has the role of a "necessary black evil...."

Who loses and who wins in this unnatural symbiosis of a crucified Jesus and a green crescent will perhaps not become known so quickly, but the idea of officializing a military alliance that already existed anyway should not be underestimated nor ridiculed. There are several convincing reasons for it.

The first is certainly contained in the truth that the Serbs in the krajinas are not in great military shape at this point, because both their human and material resources can be depleted only so far. The blockade is having its effect, and along with a certain existential hopelessness, the Serbs in the krajinas are finally facing the terrible truth: The sanctions were not instituted against Serbia, but against Serbs, wherever they might be. Which is why the death of the babies in the Banja Luka Hospital did not evoke the response in the world it should have, but neither for that matter has the previous death and suffering of the Serbs. The death of Serbs just born has been used for the terrible message that there will be no mercy toward us.

Which perhaps brings us to the key reason for the pronounced indifference toward Croatian aggressiveness and Muslim fanaticism. Just as the fact is easily ignored that 15 of Tudjman's brigades with more than 50,000

men are waging war in Bosnia, so there still has been no answer to the question of who actually massacred the people in Vasa Miskin Street when they were waiting in the bread line?

That answer could be the key point in explaining the place, time, and model of the massacre, the role of Alija Izetbegovic, Haris Silajdzic, and certain American and British experts in promoting a horrifying version of "media warfare by means of a real slaughter." The slaughter in the name of Allah, committed and followed up instantaneously by distribution of a picture of the dismembered people for propaganda purposes, facilitated breaking off the Lisbon talks, the brutal sanctions against Serbia, and its almost absolute isolation, as well as the legal military alliance against it. That is, the Croats and Muslims under the same command are perhaps only the fetus for formation of a folkloric version of multi-ethnic forces against the Serbs and Serbia. This idea must not be ignored, because it received its stimulus from a projection of the internal Serbian drama.

Should everything occur at the pace of disintegration that has held up to now, the matter could take the line of a simultaneous weakening of Serbia through its own suicidal debates and an "awakening" of Kosovo and Sandzak. Intervention from outside, accentuated only as a constant threat, would be pointless anyway if the utter exhaustion of Serbia proceeds at the pace that is already suggested. Croatia and Bosnia, as members of the western Balkan alliance, will get many public raps on the knuckles from their friends, without penalty, of course, but also modern weapons systems that would help to finally put the blockaded FR Yugoslavia into an inferior military position.

The possibility we have presented is not an apocalyptic nightmare; it is based on a global anti-Serb obsession and the outright intention to carry military operations with destructive effects to the entire territory of the newest Yugoslavia.

In case of a general Balkan catastrophe, the borders for a progressive expansion of the war would for all practical purposes be abolished. That eliminates the main motive, then, for a possible forcible pacification of Serbia, accompanied by the explanation that this is the only way to check the chaos of war. It has always been the other way around: The attempt at violence against Serbia, regardless of the military alliances involved, has been carrying the war to other areas. This is not just a matter of analogy, but of the logic of the spread of war and the absence of mechanisms at any level to keep it within rational measure or control it.

Given this gloomy reality, the military fusion of Zagreb and Sarajevo is an unpleasant open wound on the body of the world organization, which is declaratively fighting for peace. The danger is truly great, not because the force of the pact is objectively such, but because of the fanatical ambitions of its political and military leaders. The Serbs in the krajinas are in great danger. Their

survival will depend more and more on the compassion of the world at large and the total strength of the state of Serbia. Serbia's power to survive in the face of the open threats depends upon the attitude of the world, but also on termination of the destructive intra-Serb squabbles. If a model is found for national concord here, the coalition will be extinguished in the best phalangist tradition of the "Prince Eugene." If there is no concord, the anti-Serb military pacts can merely finish off what we are already doing to ourselves.

Government Mistreats Kosovars, Drops Bombs

AU0907201192 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian
26 Jun 92 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Chronology of Serbian Terror on Albanians"]

[Text] Five deputies of the Kosovo Assembly—Ekrem Kryeziu, Skender Berisha, Selajdin Braha, Qazim Thaci, and Qazim Kabashi—were arrested in Prizren at about 1800 [1600 GMT] on 23 June 1992.

The Serbian police brutally beat young Burim Krasniqi, who was driving his car to the Suhareke center at 0900 on 23 June 1992.

On 23 June 1992, the principals of the primary schools in Suhareke, Mushitisht, Leshan, and some other schools were forced to plunder school documents and record books, thus obstructing information about the Albanian schoolchildren who have graduated from the primary school. This act was accompanied by a threatening letter of forced execution.

After having raided the shop of Tahir Sylejmani from Leshan village near Peje [Pec] at about 1800 on 19 June 1992, the Serbian police called in new police forces to help. An hour later, 50 more Serbian policemen arrived and they all went to Tahir's residence, raided his house, and broke all of his furniture. They punctured the tires and smashed the lights of his tractor in his yard, and then they started to beat Tahir. They continued to beat him on the way to Peje Security Center. They tore a national flag in Tahir's shop and wrapped him with another one. They kept him in Peje until 2330. They asked him about the village activity and weapons by kicking and beating him with rubber truncheons and chairs, thus causing serious physical injuries. While raiding his house, they grabbed some Albanian magazines.

After they released him, as beaten as he was, he declared that on the same night the Serbian police raided him, they also beat Xhemail and Iber Ahmetaj and Xhemail's daughter, Emine—a teacher.

On 21 June 1992, the Serbian police beat Xhevat Krasniqi from Kliqine village in Peje Commune at the bus station while he was waiting for the bus to Germany, where he is employed. They beat his nephew, whose name we could not learn, who was waiting with Xhevat.

The Serbian police stopped Gazmend Nikci, a resident in Shtupec i Madh village, who was driving his van to Zahac village in Peje Commune at about 1100 on 22 June 1992. When they found out that he was from Rugova Mountains, they began to beat him and ask for weapons. Gazmend declared that the same Serbian police beat another passerby, whose name he did not know.

On 23 June 1992, the Serbian police blocked all city and suburb roads and bus and train stations looking for Albanian workers of the former Kosovo Interior Secretariat. They arrested Sheremet Franca, Jetulla Shaqiri, Sahit Kurti, Gani Rexha, and Beqir Dajaku and kept them at the police station for nearly three hours.

Military planes of the Serbian Army dropped 17 explosive devices with detonators in Kosovo from 1100 to 1310 on 21 June 1992. They released detonators at a height of 8,000 to 10,000 meters and carried explosive devices at a height of 600 to 400 meters above ground level. The explosives had a power of 90 decibels within a diameter of 15 kilometers.

Such explosions, which are forbidden by the UN convention, have been performed in Kosovo since 1981. In 1981 alone, there were 1,513 explosions. These explosions are used to sow fear among the Albanian population in Kosovo. Army bodies say that it is not a question of detonators, but these explosions occur at a moment when the planes exceed the voice's speed, i.e., the effect of breaking air walls. However, this argument is baseless because such an effect does not cause explosions, but another acoustic phenomenon.

This is a question of spreading fear on the eve of the formation of the Kosovo Parliament.

Serbian Police 'Mistreatment' of Albanians

AU0607181692 Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian
26 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by I.K.: "Twenty-Five Private Workers Mistreated"]

[Text] On Monday [22 June] at about 2100 the Serbian police patrol on Haxhi Zeka Street, in Bukureshe district, while checking the citizens of this district, encountered three workers of neighboring communes who had come to Peja [Pec] to work privately. They were forced to tell where they lived and also to tell where other workers lived. When the patrol found the place, they called for a large reinforcement police force, who without delay surrounded the house where 25 workers were living. The workers were from different neighboring communes, and particularly from Glogovci commune, and they had come to Peja to earn a living for themselves and for their families through daily wages. The workers handed over a common statement to the Council for Human Rights and Freedoms' Branch in Peja. They said in their statement that the policemen secretly entered the bedrooms finding all the tired workers asleep. There and

then began the mistreatment and repression. The policemen then sent all the workers, dressed as they were, to the police station in Peja, where they continued severely beating and mistreating them for about 11 hours. Avdi Kicina, a 65-year-old man, suffered the most, because he, according to the logic of the Serbian police, was more Albanian than the others: He wore a national Albanian cap. The students Nuradin Ahmeti, Ali Kastrati, Skender Hoxhaj, and the worker Muhamet Franca are in a bad condition as a result of the brutal beatings.

Biographic Data of President's General Secretary

92BA1131C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by P. Mickovic: "The President's General Secretary"]

[Text] Dr. Miodrag Mitic, who is now the former chief legal adviser of the SSIP [Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs], yesterday officially took up his new post: general secretary of Dobrica Cosic, president of FR [Federal Republic] Yugoslavia. Highly respected as an expert in diplomatic circles, Dr. Mitic is a distinguished specialist in international relations and international law.

Born 14 January 1943 in Oran, near Lebane, comes from a family of teachers: His mother and father were rural teachers. He finished high school in Leskovac and law school in Belgrade, where he graduated in 1956 [as published]. He had a liking for journalism (editing several local newspapers) and literature (wrote poetry) in high school and college.

His love for international politics won out: As a student, he was president of the university club for the United Nations. He obtained his doctorate in international law on the topic "Relations Between Diplomatic and Consular Functions."

After graduation, he held the post of secretary of the Yugoslav League for Peace. He took a job in the SSIP in 1960 [as published], in the Department for International Legal Affairs. He served two terms in the Federal Executive Council as federal under secretary for legislation (Sector for International Relations and International Legal Affairs).

Dr. Miodrag Mitic held the office of general secretary in Vienna (from 1969 to 1974) and Munich (1984-90). In the course of his diplomatic career, he has participated in several international conferences and prestigious world meetings.

He has published several scientific works in the field of international treaties, at the same time specializing in the topic of human rights and nuclear energy. His book is entitled *Odnosi izmedju diplomatskih i konsularnih funkcija* [Relations Between Diplomatic and Consular Functions].

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